Democracy in America

Tocqueville’s main goal in this section is to describe federalism and the separation of powers in the United States and its implications for American society. Tocqueville begins by recounting a brief history of the United States; while the revolution saw the colonies act as a unifying force, the end of hostilities saw a push for division and a resurgence of state sovereignty above federal. He notes that military victory in the revolution was largely due to America’s geographic position and that it is fortunate that the post-revolutionary crisis happened while most of the movement’s leaders remained alive. This led to the unusual and fortunate decision to adopt a federal constitution that decided all powers not explicitly granted to the federal government belonged to the states: “Thus the state governments remained the common rule; the federal government was the exception” (107).

Tocqueville notes that, unsurprisingly, the federal government has most foreign policy powers. It also regulates money, collects taxes, and arbitrates disputes between states. The federal government has a single court system, so it is uniform in some ways, but it is also an “assemblage of confederated republics” (109), though the federal government retains the regulation of interstate commerce, unlike in Spain.

To help resolve the relationship between the states and the Union, the Constitution created distinctions between the Senate and the House of Representatives: The first body has two senators for each state, while the second has its numbers determined by population. Tocqueville argues that this system is generally stable because the states have “homogenous mores, ideas and needs” (112), and because the Constitution recognizes the power of the states as something to be “managed and not assaulted” (112). In essence, national uniformity combines with a willingness to accept regional differences to the greatest extent possible.

The formation of the presidency, Tocqueville argues, “required that the representative of executive power be subject to the national will” (114). The Senate must approve all presidential appointments, but “it can neither force him to act nor share the executive power with him” (114). The president’s veto powers further force the legislature to consider his wishes and edit legislation, though Tocqueville considers Congress the more powerful force.

Tocqueville then turns to contrasting presidential powers to those of constitutional monarchies. Presidents do not participate in the formation of legislatures, and laws do not depend on their support. They also have no formal representation in Congress. This makes the president an “inferior and dependent power” (117). Presidents also have term limits and are dependent on the legislature to confirm their appointments. Tocqueville posits that in both France and the United States, public opinion dominates: “in America it proceeds by elections and decrees; in France, by revolutions” (117). Tocqueville ultimately decides that France is closer to a republic than a monarchy, though he notes that kings have broader appointment powers.

In considering the relative weakness of the American executive, Tocqueville names other causes besides the Constitution, specifically geography. America conducts few wars and foreign policy efforts because it is far from other countries. Turning again to the problem of legislatures, Tocqueville notes that it is not a crisis when the president and Congress are headed by different parties, as it would be in Europe. A president must execute all laws passed whether he supports them or not: “accord is not obligatory because struggle is impossible” (119).

Tocqueville argues that presidential elections are not generally a struggle for power and influence, as “he can distribute to his friends neither much power nor much wealth nor much glory, and his influence in the state is too feeble for the factions to see their success or their ruin in his elevation to power” (121). Despite this, he considers elections destabilizing, as they force presidents and the public to focus on events ahead rather than day-to-day affairs. He therefore considers it fortunate that while presidential elections are frequent, executive powers are “weak and circumscribed” (122). American politics are largely dependent on the “mass of people” (122), and frequent elections do not threaten national security because America is isolated.

While elections can be destabilizing, Tocqueville argues that American elites mitigated this danger partly through democratic traditions and the method chosen, and partly due to their geographic position. First, Americans chose to insulate legislative politics and factions from the electoral process. They chose an electoral college that met only once and had no other function. The right of the House to vote on ties was also restricted, as it could only vote on candidates who had obtained the most votes.

Tocqueville notes that while the presidency is weak, parties and factions do form during elections, as parties use their candidate to prove their legislative agenda will gain support in case of victory. Re-election also preoccupies presidents: “he no longer governs in the interest of the state, but in that of his reelection,” and public opinion is consumed by it, a process Tocqueville calls a “storm” (127). While he makes clear in earlier sections that he supports democracy on the local level, Tocqueville is more concerned with the negative consequences of federal elections.

Tocqueville then introduces the arguments in favor of and against the re-election of a chief executive. The primary reason is to prevent “the peculiar result that a man would be excluded from the government at the very moment when he had succeeded in proving that he was capable of governing well” (128). On the other hand, elected officials may use unlawful tools, namely state power, to further their re-election efforts. Worst of all, to Tocqueville, is the likelihood that a president seeking re-election would hesitate to veto bills, and thus the legislature, and the opinions of the majority, would rule unchecked. He argues that when they did so, the authors of the Constitution “exposed the country to dangers every day” (130). Tocqueville, then, positions a single authoritative individual as more vital to democracy than the popular will, as much as he previously championed popular participation in town meetings.

In his analysis of the judicial system, Tocqueville notes that federal courts touch on obvious matters of federal jurisdiction, such as disputes between states. He notes that the Supreme Court is inherently political since it deals with the execution of federal law and not with relationships between citizens. Their purview is vast, because “without them, the Constitution is a dead letter” (142). Many aspects of separation of powers and federalism depend on it; legislatures and states appeal to it against presidents, and the federal system itself appeals to it to compel state obedience. It is so integral to democracy that Tocqueville declares, “But if the Supreme Court ever came to be composed of imprudent or corrupt men, the confederation would have to fear anarchy or civil war” (142). Federal states particularly need strong judiciaries to ensure laws are obeyed—which contributes to the dangers posed by judicial abuse.

Tocqueville continues his critique of federal systems when he considers state constitutions. He notes that elections on the state level happen frequently, which means legislators are quick to follow popular sentiment. Most legislatures are elected in the same manner, unlike on the federal level, so “this gave a violent and hasty character to the formation of the laws” (145). Judicial independence is also less established. Tocqueville argues that state authority is too susceptible to popular will and legislative power is too strong. Tocqueville is deeply suspicious of too much accountability to the uneducated popular masses; this suggests that for all his certainty democracy is inevitable, he is not reassured by this prospect.

Turning back to the US Constitution, Tocqueville finds more ways American government is exceptional. Tocqueville notes that other confederated governments with federal systems exist, as in Switzerland. What makes the Constitution unique is “[t]he American states that united in 1789 not only consented that the federal government dictate their laws, but also that it execute its laws by itself” (147).

This arrangement provides Americans with some flexibility: Laws can be locally specific, so that love of one’s state helps foster love of country. The dual sovereignties mean that the federal government operates as a kind of “legal fiction” which is successful because of “homogeneity of civilization” (155, 158). Additionally, there is no need for greater federal authority to fight foreign wars. Tocqueville’s vision of federalism’s success rests on cultural cohesion, geographic isolation, and the maintenance of local tradition as a means of maintaining loyalty to federal power.