logo

70 pages 2 hours read

John W. Dower

Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1999

A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.

Part II, Chapters 3-5Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Part II: “Transcending Despair”

Part II, Chapter 3 Summary: “Kyodatsu: Exhaustion and Despair”

In “Transcending Despair,” Dower systematically addresses all the horrors of postwar recovery in Japan: the general psychological state of the Japanese, extreme food shortages, malnutrition, the looting by the Japanese officials after the surrender, an increased rate of serious illnesses, homelessness, hyperinflation, and the black market. He starts off by comparing the war experiences of the Americans and Japanese, respectively. For Americans, the Second World War lasted for just under four years. With the exception of Pearl Harbor, most of the fighting did not affect the American territory or American civilians. In contrast, the war lasted for almost 15 years for the Japanese, starting with their entry into Manchuria in 1931 and followed by a full-scale war against all of China in 1937. The Japanese civilians experienced the devastation of aerial bombings, which destroyed up to 40% of urban infrastructure (as Dower outlined in the previous section of the book). The author thus compares the Americans’ “self-righteous confidence” with the Japanese “socialization for death” (87).

The term kyodatsu literally means “collapse.” This term was first limited to clinical psychology, denoting despair and physical exhaustion. However, in the postwar Japanese society, the term gained currency and was broadly applied to describe the condition in which much of the Japanese society found itself. Dower even provides documentary photographs from this period to demonstrate the look of hopelessness and defeat in people’s eyes. This hopelessness led to the rise of alcoholism and substance use as well as crime. Japan’s defeat and defeatist attitudes also translated into questioning (and sometimes despising) authority. Some people coped with the hardship though dark humor.

A far cry from the Japanese culture of honor, the military funding ended up in the private hands of the elites shortly before the emperor’s surrender address. Following the address, this pattern escalated:

The impression one gains from later investigations into these activities is that during the turbulent two weeks following the emperor’s broadcast, a great many men of influence spent most of their waking hours looting military storehouses, arranging hasty payments from the military budget or from the Bank of Japan to contractors and cronies, and destroying documents (113).

It is unclear whether the remaining funding would have fundamentally improved Japan’s postwar conditions. However, Dower provides a clear image that the Japanese wartime elites were looking out for themselves rather than the people of Japan.

Japanese starvation was a matter more complex than that of the loss of food supplies from the rest of Asia:

Hunger was not simply a product of defeat. Rather, it derived from the desperate prolongation of the emperor’s lost war, besides being compounded by a disastrous harvest and exacerbated by the confusion, corruption, and ineptitude of the postsurrender elites. A majority of Japanese already were malnourished at the time of surrender (90).

Dower provides statistical evidence of starvation and graphic photographs featuring malnourished Japanese. For instance, the children of Japan were physically smaller in 1946 than those in 1937. Two years after the surrender, the calorie intake for an average-sized adult dropped to somewhere between a quarter to a third of the 2,200-calorie norm. As a result, people became obsessed with food. Those areas of Tokyo that were destroyed by bombs were converted to vegetable gardens. Others ate everything remotely edible, such as potato vines. Some urban residents bartered away their possessions in exchange for farmers’ food.

Postwar hyperinflation exacerbated the overall situation. These economic conditions lasted longer than four years, that is, longer than the Pacific War itself. The Japanese government attempted to mitigate the situation by introducing price controls in the official market. They also introduced the new yen, to no avail. Prices continued to rise. Dower demonstrates that 1.5 kilograms of rice cost 2.7 yen in June 1946, rising to 62.3 yen in March 1950. These economic conditions gave rise to the black market, which routinely engaged in price gouging. The Japanese transition to a nonmilitarized economy was difficult.

Homelessness persisted during the occupation. For instance, two years after the surrender, some people were still forced to live in the underground passages of the Tokyo metro system. Dower describes the police rounding up hundreds of people from the Ueno station in that city. With these postwar conditions, serious illnesses naturally also remained a concern. For example, in 1945, deaths from dysentery doubled, whereas tuberculosis was the most serious threat to public health. In general, Japan’s postwar conditions were difficult for years after the official end of the Second World War.

Part II, Chapter 4 Summary: “Cultures of Defeat”

The fourth chapter broadly examines the subject of human resilience in the face of war fatigue and postwar despair. The author refers to this phenomenon as the “spirit of individual survival” (146), arguing that the Japanese were able to gradually transcend this despair. Dower’s focal point are the subcultures on the margins of society: the sex workers engaged with the American occupation troops, black-market vendors, as well as street gangs, and the yakuza—the Japanese mafia. Dower supplements his analysis with popular magazines and pulp literature to identify some of the common themes of the material.

The author analyzes the operations of the sex industry in early postwar Japan as well as the industry’s relationship with the American occupation troops. Considering the dismal socio-economic conditions at this time, many women were forced into sex work due to lacking basic necessities. They were known as the “women of the dark,” or panpan (124-25). Wanting to protect what they perceived as the more reputable women of Japan from American occupiers, Japan’s officials attempted to partly legalize the sex-work industry by establishing the so-called comfort facilities; in other words, the officials believed that if the American occupiers had access to sex work services provided by financially desperate women, it would prevent the more “reputable” women from being sexually assaulted. Initially, these facilities were organized secretly by Japan’s Home Ministry through agreements with “entrepreneurs.”

Soon, the necessity to “defend young women of Japan” (125)—by preventing sexual assault—translated into official support for these facilities by several administrative bodies, including the Ministry of Finance, the Home Ministry, and the Foreign Ministry. The Tokyo RAA, Recreation and Amusement Association, regulated sex work serving Americans. However, there were many problems with this arrangement. First, many sex workers were terrified of Americans as a result of wartime propaganda. Second, those who were engaged in sex work were doubly vulnerable: not just the women struggling to support themselves in other ways, but also “third-country people”—the Chinese, Japanese, and those of other ethnicities. This category of women already faced prejudice in their daily life. The sex workers in the RAA served anywhere between 15 to 60 American GIs on a daily basis. Some women, forced into these conditions, died by suicide.

Dower also details the involvement of various regulating bodies managing the industry, such as the municipal government’s hygiene department in the capital. In light of all the problems, the RAA was dismantled in January 1946. One of the key reasons for this decision was the skyrocketing venereal diseases among the occupation troops. Soon, however, public sex work transformed into red-line districts. Dower estimates that anywhere between 55,000-70,000 women turned to sex work during occupation.

Sex work was also linked to kasutori culture (bunka)—a response to postwar hardship, ranging from escapism to sexualization. The term kasutori referred to a particular kind of drink—a favorite of artists “who made a cult out of degeneracy and nihilism” (148). This outlook also emerged in popular magazines, such as Fuufu Sekai (Couples’ World) and Aijou Sakasu (Love Love). The kasutori culture lasted into the 1950s—“a legacy of escapism, titillation, and outright sleaze” (148). The sensuality of these publications stood in stark contrast to wartime militarism.

Yet another development was the open-air markets, in which people—spontaneous entrepreneurs—sold many small items. By October 1945, there were approximately 17,000 such establishments throughout Japan. Joblessness pushed people into the black markets, where even children worked as vendors. Due to the markets’ nature, the yakuza played a dominant role. Gangs divided cities amongst themselves. For instance, the Matsuda gang ruled the Shinbashi area of Tokyo, whereas the Ueda gang took charge of the Ginza district. Despite the mafia’s presence, the police were sometimes ineffective. Systemic corruption significantly exacerbated this issue. Eventually, however, markets became more organized. In 1946, the Shinbashi market enjoyed police control as well as vendor unions as a result of these improvements.

Part II, Chapter 5 Summary: “Bridges of Language”

The final chapter of Part II focuses on other types of literature, such as newspapers and bestsellers, and analyzes how specific words (and communication in general) were used to transition from wartime to postwar conditions. According to Dower, language and identity are interrelated. One key change was realism, the Japanese citizens’ eventual response to their government’s fabricated idealism: Japanese wartime propaganda promoted Japan as the source of civilization for the rest of its empire—“imperial culture is the light of Asia” (176). The government propagandistically romanticized Japan’s imperialism to overcome the economic constraints of a global economic downturn and catch up with other developed countries. At the same time, Japanese militarism did not allow for deviations from this supremacist paradigm, nor did it allow satire and self-deprecating humor. It was this type of humor that arose in postwar Japan to challenge the previous decade. Words describing optimism and brightness became more common. Gambaru, a more realistic paradigm of doing one’s best, was part of the postwar exhortations to work for reconstruction, peace, democracy, or the new Japan.

The Japanese were already expected to embrace change rather than maintain the status quo. For this reason, looking “into the future with a sense of continuity and hope” was not an unusual transition for that country (179). One way in which this transition occurred was the explosion of periodicals and book publishing in the immediate aftermath of the war. These publications were also diverse; for instance, there was an increase in those catering to a female audience. If at the end of the war, there were an estimated 300 publishing houses, less than a year later, this number increased to nearly 2,000. By 1948, the number of publishing houses more than doubled. Japan experienced a true hunger for words.

Some publications, such as the Kyōryoku Shimbun (Cooperative Press), engaged with grand narratives, such as transforming the national purpose of Japan from wartime militarism and austerity to postwar objectives, with titles like a “Guide to Recovery Issue” (183). Others rejected militarism in more subtle ways such as positioning Japan as a country of great cultural importance. The Shinsei (New Life) periodical boldly announced that the old Japan was defeated. Some publications, like the 1946 bestseller The Twenty-Year Whirlwind (Sempu Nijunen), addressed wartime Japan in an authentic, self-reflective manner by examining the destruction of that period. Overall, these publications rejected wartime militarism in one way or another.

Translations of foreign literature also became very popular at this time. Jean-Paul Sartre’s Nausea, for instance, made it to the top 10 sellers in 1946. A brief English-language conversation book created by the editor Ogawa Kikimatsu did even better by maintaining the record for an all-time bestseller until 1981. The Japanese society not only embraced the explosion of literature but also displayed an openness to outside perspectives from foreign literature.

In addition to regular periodicals, Japan produced other unusual publications. One author, the Catholic scientist Takashi Nagai, was known as the “saint of Nagasaki.” He died of the long-term effects of radiation in 1951:

Essentially, he regarded the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as the act of a Christian God meant to bring the world to its senses. That the second atomic bomb fell on a city with a long tradition of Christianity only reinforced his sense of divine intervention (198).

Nagai’s rejection of militarism was part of the broader mystical Christian tradition.

Part II, Chapters 3-5 Analysis

In the second part of his book, Dower raises a number of issues that surpass his subject of postwar Japan and can be applied to analyzing wars in general. He rigorously details the serious issues that Japan faced after the surrender. These issues included hyperinflation, homelessness due to aerial bombing, joblessness due to the loss of war industries, malnutrition due to supply cuts, and a spike in serious illnesses such as tuberculosis. Therefore, Dower wonders whether the end of the war could truly be dated to 1945 with its effects felt long thereafter. Similar reasoning could be applied to the western European reconstruction, in which the Europeans themselves were responsible for most of the effort. However, the Marshall Plan (1948-1951) provided the necessary push. It was only in the early 1950s that European industries reached prewar levels. Europe also faced issues similar to Japan’s with millions of displaced persons and destroyed infrastructure. The Soviet Union, having lost 27 million people and having taken the brunt of the fighting on the Eastern front, was even worse off.

Another central issue is the American occupation goals for Japan: demilitarization and democratization. Germany underwent a process of demilitarization similar to Japan’s. The Allied victors reduced the arms and the armed forces of the defeated countries, viewing it as a way to prevent future armed conflicts. Democratization was a more complex issue. Here, American occupants sought to impose a form of governing similar to their own onto foreign people. However, Dower makes a strong case for democratizing Japan. For instance, he describes the mass-scale looting and destruction of wartime documents that took place at the hands of the Japanese elites in the two weeks following the surrender. He underscores the fact that these elites cared more for themselves than the people they ruled. The author also describes the rampant systemic corruption in the early postwar period, such as the police’s inability to enforce laws.

Japan’s postwar subcultures, panpan, the black-market workers, the gangs, and pulp literature also offer an important glimpse into this period. It was these subcultures that first forged a new space and overcame the postwar despair. The “margins of ‘respectable society’” also included many “third-country people”—non-Japanese, such as Koreans, Chinese, and even Okinawans who often faced prejudice (122). Despite being part of present-day Japan, Okinawa has its own unique culture and history. For this reason, Okinawans were sometimes perceived as not quite Japanese. These subcultures were particularly resilient. In addition to textual sources, Dower uses photography to display this resilience. One photograph shows a model wearing a white bathing suit against the background of a gritty cityscape. This image is both surprising, defiant, and even somewhat humorous, and it is emblematic of the Japanese attitude that eventually arose.

The sex worker plays a central role in these subcultures for a number of reasons. First, the panpan were “associated with the liberation of repressed sensuality” (133). This sensuality starkly contrasted with the militarist austerity of the prolonged war period. The rise of sensuality, romantic outlooks, and the desire for physical intimacy also appeared in many magazines. Second, Dower makes a historical comparison of the postwar sex workers to the courtesans of the past: Whereas the courtesans had special talents, such as being well-versed in the arts and leading intricate tea ceremonies, the panpan of the postwar era also had special skills, such as speaking limited English. The panpan subculture also came to symbolize materialism—the perceived symbol of the United States: “Among ordinary people, no group tapped the material treasures of the conquerors as blatantly as the panpan” (135-36). For instance, some sex workers wore striking makeup associated with Hollywood glamor. Such aesthetics, too, deviated from the austerity of Japanese militarism and the economic hardship of the early postwar period.

Yet the importance of panpan goes even further. Dower argues that the interactions between the American troops and Japanese women created the “erotification of defeated Japan in the eyes of the conquerors” (137). The author uses gendered language, linking the conquerors and the conquered to make far-reaching foreign-policy analogies, and argues that the “complex interplay of assumed masculine and feminine roles that has colored US-Japan relations ever since” (137). Japan later became an ally of the United States through the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan (1960). However, as a hegemon, the United States typically treats its allies in an unequal manner—as junior partners. Therefore, using the historically unequal relationship between men and women makes metaphoric sense.

Popular print and communication consistently offer a glimpse into the changing society of postwar Japan. By providing a detailed look at the diversity of opinions, Dower challenges many racialized stereotypes about the Japanese. Indeed, his discussion of the “great river of communication” transcends culture and serves as a source of empathy for the human experience at large (168).

The author also pays attention to an important historical theme of continuations and breaks. Japan’s surrender after an almost 15-year-long war was a major paradigm shift as the nation transformed from a militarist empire into a peaceful democracy. At the same time, many Japanese looked “into the future with a sense of continuity and hope” (179). The postwar Japanese society offered many links to the past, the most important being the rebranded Emperor Hirohito around whom many ordinary Japanese galvanized.

blurred text
blurred text
blurred text
blurred text

Related Titles

By John W. Dower