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John W. DowerA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
In “Victor’s Justice, Loser’s Justice,” Dower explores the details and the complexities of The International Military Tribunal (1946-1948) for the Far East, also known as the Tokyo War Crimes Trials or the Tokyo Tribunal. He provides statistical information about the proceedings; discusses the way colonialist thinking played into the trials; offers contemporary criticism; and compares the trials to their counterpart in Nuremberg.
In the early postwar period, the Allies were motivated both by hatred and by hope, which was evident during the war-crimes trials. In light of the Japanese atrocities carried out in all military theaters, such as the Rape of Nanking, the Allies desired both vengeance and retributive justice. The war crimes included three categories, “Class A,” “Class B,” and “Class C.” “Class A” referred to crimes against peace, such as planning a war of aggression. “Class B” crimes included “conventional” war crimes—violating the established rules of war such as shooting POWs. “Class C” included crimes against humanity; these include various types of wartime inhumanities such as murder, enslavement, and persecution on the grounds of racial or political affiliation, among others. There were some exceptions to these proceedings: The US military tried Generals Masaharu Homma and Tomoyuki Yamashita in the Philippines. Both were found culpable for their troops’ behavior—the Bataan Death March for Homma—and were executed.
Not only did the legal proceedings at Nuremberg and Tokyo extend the interpretation of crimes against humanity, but they also used the broadly-defined “Class A” crimes against peace—a “momentous development” (444). Anyone, civilian or military, could be tried for these crimes. However, the “Class A” charges generally targeted the Japanese military and political leadership. In contrast to Nuremberg and its four judges, the Tokyo trials had 11 judges. At one point, 100 attorneys worked during the proceedings. The 818 sessions during 417 days included 419 witnesses and affidavits or depositions from another 779 people. Legal professionals presented 4,336 exhibits of 30,000 pages. The scope and the theatricality of the Tokyo trials were but one key difference between them and the Nuremberg counterpart:
There was no Japanese cabal of leaders comparable to Hitler and his henchmen. (Emperor Hirohito was, in fact, the only person in Japan who had been at the center of power during the entire course of the alleged ‘conspiracy.’) There were no organizational counterparts to the Nazi party and its affiliated criminal organs, such as the Gestapo and the SS (which made the charge of conspiracy easier to argue in the German case); nor, despite the horrendous litany of atrocities exposed in the Tokyo proceedings, including the massacres in Nanking and Manila, was there a real counterpart to the genocide planned and carried out by the Germans (458).
Dower refers to these proceedings as “showcase trials.” Many soldiers privately questioned them. The scope of the Tokyo trials also had many high-ranking critics:
Even General MacArthur was taken by surprise by the scope and innovation of this legal project—and deemed it excessive. He privately indicated that he thought justice could have been served by brief military proceedings focusing on the treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor (454).
American diplomat George Kennan working for the State Department was even more critical after he visited Japan in March 1948. He believed that the trials were “profoundly misconceived from the start,” whereas the punishment targeting the Japanese leadership was “surrounded with the hocus-pocus of a judicial procedure which belies its real nature” (452). Concluding this secret report to the Policy Planning Staff, Kennan wrote that the Tokyo trials were “political trials […] not law” (452).
When the Tokyo trials commenced, the defense debated certain general questions, like one of the retroactive crimes, arguing that aggressive wars are not themselves illegal. They also challenged the notion of holding accountable individual leadership, because war is “the act of a nation” (464). The trial was wrought with the use of loose evidence, which was “a gateway through which arbitrariness and unfairness entered the trials” (466). This type of evidence included hearsay, diaries, and unsworn statements. The greatest influence on the prosecutorial part of the trial was Tanaka Ryūkichi, a former general, and Koichi Kido, Hirohito’s adviser during the war.
The trial also revealed the prevalence of colonial thinking. First, the Japanese themselves were excluded from prosecuting the war crimes; Allied logic conjectured that the Japanese, because they were all culpable to some degree, were neither trustworthy nor competent to evaluate these matters of justice. Second, of 11 judges, only three were Asian despite the fact that the Japanese imperial army occupied Asian countries with Asian victims. Indeed, this war in Asia took place “on a map overwhelmingly demarcated by the colors of colonialism” (469), and here was Japan being judged by other colonial powers: US, Britain, the Netherlands, and France.
Chapter 16 is one of the most complex sections of Embracing Defeat because it examines the subject of public memory. Dower analyzes dozens of textual sources—from the convicted war criminals’ final words to fictional literature. His investigation reveals diverse perspectives: blaming the Japanese leadership for defeat, Christian and Buddhist perspectives, and even the public rehabilitation of convicted war criminals all the way to getting elected for political office.
The author points out that the winning side in war usually makes heroes of everyone who fights for it. It also offers some meaning: “Triumph gave a measure of closure to grief” (486). In contrast, the losing side struggles with closure, the defeat leaving their grief “raw and open” (486). These questions of meaning and memory surpass cultural differences and are universal. For the Japanese, their loss made them question the responsibility for defeat. Major Japanese publications, such as Mainichi, discussed the far-reaching subject of “war responsibility” (491). This discussion amounted to “pointing fingers at those leaders who were primarily responsible for the great ‘crime’ of bringing about ‘miserable defeat’” (491). However, the journalists failed to display self-reflection and “were not particularly interested in exposing the nature of Japan’s aggression or its victimization of others” (491). They even failed to mention the well-known war crimes, like the Rape of Nanking.
The way the imperial army’s behavior fits into public memory is one of the author’s key discussions. Dower argues that many Japanese, especially men, were aware of the imperial forces’ wartime atrocities. They witnessed them personally or simply learned about them. At the same time, the civilian deaths in Allied aerial bombings of Japan and, specifically, the nuclear strike on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, complicate this issue. The first survey for the public prior to the occupation “pronounced Hiroshima and Nagasaki a ‘living hell’” (492). The survey proceeded to provide graphic details about the effects of radiation, describing the “’evil spirit’ possessing Hiroshima” (492). Dower believes:
There was a widespread sense of having experienced a forbidding, surreal new dimension of existence which no other people could hope to comprehend. Such consciousness of nuclear destruction became an integral even if not always evident part of all subsequent attempts to come to terms with the war’s meaning. It reinforced a pervasive sense of powerlessness and lent an eerie kind of specialness to what might otherwise have felt like a pointless defeat (492-93).
The question of the victims and aggressors and, at times, the blurred lines between them, is another central theme in Dower’s book.
There was also a religious dimension to discussing the aftermath of the war, defeat, and grieving the war dead both among Japan’s Christian minority and the Buddhists. Dower returns to Shigeru Nabara, Tokyo University’s President. Nabara experienced “a heavy burden of personal guilt for having encouraged his students to support the wartime mission of ‘our glorious nation’” (487). After the war, however, he became one of the war’s biggest critics and a peace advocate as a result of “a conversion experience” (487). Buddhist thinking about the meaning of war appeared in the famous Harp of Burma (Biruma no Tategoto) written by Michio Takeyama. This fictional work addressed the subjects of guilt, suffering, and making amends within the framework of Buddhism. Takeyama’s main character, Yasuhiko Mizushima, is an ex-soldier. This protagonist “became the great fictive consoler of the souls of the country’s war dead” by wandering through the jungle of Burma as a priest and burying the remains of the Japanese soldiers (502). Dower describes Mizushima’s self-reflection:
Tormented by the question, so central to Buddhism, of why there is so much suffering and misery in the world, Mizushima concludes that humans will never understand perfectly. Still, Japan had brought its recent suffering upon itself. Our country waged war, was defeated, and now suffers. That is because our desires got out of hand (502).
Takeyama’s answer to his protagonist’s predicament is the service of others.
Some Japanese, however, expressed anger at the leadership, especially those convinced of “Class A” war crimes. Some anger was directed at General Hideki Tōjō, a wartime prime minister, who was convicted as one of the main culprits. The writer Jan Takami described his anger as follows:
Cowardly living on, and then using a pistol like a foreigner, failing to die. Japanese cannot help but smile bitterly. Why did General Tōjō not die right away as Army Minister Anami did? Why did General Tōjō not use a Japanese sword as Army Minister Anami did? (492).
Tōjō accepted responsibility for war at the tribunal and was ultimately convicted. The quote conveys the writer’s view of Tōjō’s suicide attempt as dishonorable. Ultimately, the former prime minister was executed as a war criminal in December 1948.
Whereas some war criminals were executed, others “made the transition from notoriety to celebrity status and commercial success without even making an interim stop at Sugamo” (511). One such example is the Masanobu Tsuji, a former colonel. At the end of the war, though he was a wanted war criminal, he was able to stay in China, then return to Japan “disguised as a Chinese professor” (511). Tsuji lived in secret “with the full knowledge of General Willoughby and the support of former army colleagues” (511). Ultimately, the US lifted his war-criminal designation, and Tsuji was elected to the House of Representatives in the Ishikawa prefecture.
Tsuji’s case was unexceptional in terms of rehabilitation. In the early 1950s, Japanese publishers released more than 15 books featuring the final words of war criminals who had been executed. These final words came in the form of death poems, letters to families, and their final statements in general: “Their compatriots were giving these men the last word in the most effective manner possible, by letting them speak as if from the grave” (415). Dower describes the most famous of these books, Testaments of the Century (Seiki no Isho), released in 1953 and featuring 692 executed war criminals. The author believes that this book and others like it were compelling because “these words reflected the thoughts and emotions of men looking death in the eye” (416).
However, Dower does not find a sense of glorification or anger in Testaments of the Century. Instead, there was “an overwhelming feeling of waste, regret, and sorrow” (519). Because death was imminent for these war criminals, Dower suggests that the “final words of the war criminals were not so different as might be imagined from those of the student conscripts killed in the war” (519).
The question of war-crime trials is one of the most complex in Embracing Defeat. The Allies were motivated by sentiments ranging from desires for justice to vengefulness. In light of the Japanese imperial army’s atrocities, such as the Rape of Nanking or the Bataan Death March, such sentiments may be expected—but Dower presents much evidence that the legal standard for the Tokyo Tribunal was loose, such as including hearsay evidence. The opposition to the scope or the quality of the trial on the part of major American figures, including General MacArthur and George Kennan, points to problems within the legal proceedings. Other issues include the complete exclusion of the Japanese from the prosecution and the underrepresentation of Asian judges over crimes committed in Asia. It was as if Asian victims were less important. For all these reasons, the author refers to the proceedings as “show trials.”
The Tokyo Tribunal raised even more general questions, such as what constitutes an aggressive, unprovoked war in the field of international law. Ideally, international law should be objective. However, the international consensus results from unequal geopolitical players, power relationships, and their own vested interests. The latter question is also relevant in the context of colonialism. Some of the Allied victors, such as Britain, were themselves colonial powers with empires built through conquest and exploitation of the Global South—yet here they stood in judgment of defeated Japan, another colonial power.
As a result of the tribunals pertaining to the WWII Pacific theater, thousands of Japanese war criminals were convincted and hundreds executed. Having a legal judgment allowed many ordinary Japanese blame their leadership for defeat without engaging sufficient self-reflection. The subject of war memory and honoring the dead is difficult, especially in defeat: There are no heroic sacrifices to honor, no victories to glorify. In Japan’s case, its industrial-scale devastation from Allied bombing campaigns and civilian deaths, including those prolonged from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki radiation, made the Japanese themselves into victims. Defeat and victimhood compounded the difficulty of processing the experience of militarism and war. Many authors thus turned to fictional writing to fully explore these themes.
Soon, however, another aspect of collective memory became prominent: one of forgetting. Some Japanese moved on with their lives in light of economic recovery and growing social stability. Others whitewashed their war criminals by publishing their final words in popular books and even electing them to public office. To this day, the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo causes regular controversy. The shrine not only commemorates millions of war dead in general but also specifically some of Japan’s convicted war criminals, including “Class A” counterparts. The visits to the shrine by top Japanese officials caused an outcry in countries that suffered from Japanese imperialism, and it highlights that Japan’s war memory and legacy remain challenging (Takenaka, Akiko. Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and Japan’s Unending Postwar. University of Hawaii Press, 2015).
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