Freezing Order: A True Story of Money Laundering, Murder, and Surviving Vladimir Putin's Wrath

Because of a criminal complaint filed by Browder’s team, the French police raided the luxury villa of a Russian woman in mid-May 2016 and arrested her for money laundering. In the fifth freezing order of the Magnitsky case, the French froze $9 million in her accounts in France, Luxembourg, and Monaco. Browder explains that money laundering is “both complicated and simple” (189). Using wire transfers, money launderers “create hundreds of accounts in dozens of banks in the names of countless shell companies and then wire the money so many times and in so many denominations that they hope” (189) no one tracks it. In the Russian cases, the money starts in Russia, goes through transit countries, and ends in places like the US, France, and Switzerland. Kleiner and now others were tracking these launderers.

Luke Harding, a British journalist, alerted Browder to an upcoming story about Sergei Roldugin, a cellist from St. Petersburg. A close friend of Putin’s, Roldugin controlled companies that had accumulated over $2 billion since 2000. Putin couldn’t have his name on these companies, so he had his friend, whom he could trust, hold them. Browder’s team found that $800,000 of the stolen $230 million was linked to Putin via Roldugin. This linked Putin to the crime that Magnitsky exposed. No wonder he was so opposed to the Magnitsky Acts: They “put his wealth and power at risk” (196).

Dana Rohrabacher, a Republican member of Congress from California, traveled to Moscow and had closed-door meetings with high-level officials there. Known to have sympathies for Putin, Rohrabacher had voted against the Magnitsky Act. Currently, the Global Magnitsky Act was on the House agenda. The bill, which had already passed the Senate, would enable the US government “to impose asset freezes and travel bans on human rights violators and kleptocrats from anywhere in the world” (199). Upon his return, Rohrabacher managed to get this bill pulled from the agenda of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Browder then contacted a journalist at National Review, a conservative publication, and explained how the House committee had fallen victim to Russian propaganda and manipulation. The Republican Chair of the Committee, Royce, reinstated the bill on the agenda.

The Russian authorities produced a film, The Magnitsky Act: Behind the Scenes, which spread lies and disinformation about the law. They hoped to plant doubt about the facts and prevent Magnitsky Acts from passing. Invoking libel laws and promising lawsuits, Browder prevented the screening of this film at the European Parliament and on television stations in Europe.

Prior to the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s hearing on the Global Magnitsky Act in May, further efforts were made to strike the bill from the agenda. Cymrot, the attorney for Prevezon, participated in those efforts. Representative Rohrabacher unsuccessfully tried to remove Magnitsky’s name from the law. When the law came up for consideration by the committee, Rohrabacher accused Browder of stealing the $230 million and effectively used “his position as a US congressman to assist the Russian government in their cover-up of a political murder” (209). Fortunately, the other members of the committee didn’t accept his arguments, and the bill passed the committee by a vote of 46-1.

Just when Browder thought the Global Magnitsky Act would sail through smoothly in the House, the Russians arranged for a screening of their libelous documentary at Newseum. Because Newseum was dedicated to free speech, preventing the screening (as was done in Europe) wouldn’t be feasible. Ahead of the screening, the Russian lawyer Veselnitskaya hired a skilled public relations expert, Glenn Simpson, to smear Browder and Magnitsky. As a result, an article favoring the Russians appeared in The New York Times. Representative Rohrabacher sent letters inviting members of Congress to attend the screening; none did, however. At the screening, Russians working against the Magnitsky Act were well represented—but so were Russian dissidents. At the end of the screening, there were “boos and jeers” (218). Members of the audience, which included a cofounder of the NGO that had worked on the Moldovan file, exposed the lies in the documentary. Press coverage the next day called the film “Russia’s Big Lie” (219). Meanwhile, Browder’s attorney’s arguments at the Federal Appeals Court in New York to disqualify Moscow and BakerHostetler were well received.

Disgusted with Americans like Cymrot and Moscow, who were aiding Putin for financial rewards, Browder was heartened to hear about the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). This law required “anyone trying to influence US policy on behalf of a foreign government” (223) to register with the Department of Justice (DOJ). None of those involved in the Prevezon case and anti-Magnitsky efforts had. On July 15, 2016, Browder’s team filed a criminal complaint with the head of FARA, accusing seven Americans—including Cymrot and Simpson—of violating this law. To pressure the DOJ to act, Browder tried (but failed) to get the story in the press. The problem was that the press depended on Simpson for information about Donald Trump and Russia, and FARA proved to be a “dead end” (225). However, the Federal Appeals Court ruled in Browder’s favor, disqualifying Moscow and BakerHostetler from the Prevezon case.

In the lead-up to the US presidential election of 2016, Browder wondered why Trump was so pro-Putin and was concerned about it. He heard a rumor that Putin had perverted videos of Trump with women. BuzzFeed later published a 35-page dossier, written by a former British intelligence officer, alleging that Trump would receive a 19% interest in Russia’s largest oil company and repeating the claim about videos. However, Simpson, who was working for the Russians at the time, was involved in preparing the dossier. This tainted it. Browder speculated that Simpson put some false information in the dossier to discredit the whole thing as a fake. The prospect that any of this information had truth terrified Browder.

Obama signed the Global Magnitsky Act into law on December 23, 2016, and added five names to its list. Browder feared that Trump would be reluctant to add names to the list of Russians whose assets should be frozen. Because Russia interfered in the US election, Obama’s administration imposed sanctions on Russia and expelled many diplomats. Ordinarily, Russia responds but didn’t this time. Browder notes, “Putin now had his man in the White House” (233).

When the Russians named Magnitsky as a co-conspirator with the convict Khlebnikov in the theft of the $230 million, Nikolai Gorokhov, Magnitsky’s attorney, could legally access the file. Although Gorokhov’s requests were denied 11 times, a Russian judge finally granted him access to the 94-volume file. He soon realized that the file included data showing the actual money transfers that had occurred in Russia. Since this would implicate the perpetrators and exonerate Magnitsky, Gorokhov took digital photos of the file. He then met with the US Attorney prosecuting the Prevezon case in London and agreed to come to New York to give a deposition. He and his family stayed in a government safe house and he gave evidence on October 1. He then returned with his family to Moscow.

He subsequently discovered emails that provided evidence of collusion between Pavlov, Klyuev’s personal attorney, and the Russian Interior Ministry to cover up the theft of the $230 million. However, the day before he was going to present this information to a Russian judge, he fell from his rooftop. Although the authorities claimed this was an accident, the evidence showed foul play. His wife maintained that “a deliberate attempt” had been made on his life “for his work on the Magnitsky case” (241) and filed a complaint. Gorokhov was in the ICU with multiple broken bones, internal bleeding, and damage to his eye. He was able to return home, where he and his wife were badgered by police to sign false statements and withdraw the complaint. They didn’t comply.