On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society

Among elite combat units, there is a powerful sense of accountability to one another. When such groups sustain high casualty rates, such as 50%, the group courts defeat as it slips into depression and apathy. Such soldiers “would rather die” (150) than let their comrades down.

When such a tight bond exists among soldiers, there is a greater probability that each soldier will kill. In addition, groups facilitate killing by providing a sense of anonymity. In large crowds, bystanders are unlikely to interfere to help someone in trouble and individuals are more likely to do things that they would otherwise not do. They become part of a mob. Likewise, soldiers in military units commit acts of violence that they would not do individually.

Grossman concludes that the combination of accountability to comrades and anonymity plays a substantial role in the facilitation of killing. He argues that this effectiveness explains the dominant role of the chariot in military history, as it was operated via a group and provided mutual surveillance and anonymity.

Distance in war is not just physical, but cultural, moral, social, and mechanical. Without emotional distance from the enemy, the Stockholm syndrome can reduce the likelihood of participation in killing. In that syndrome, the victim associates with the hostage taker and reduces identification with authorities negotiating with the hostage taker, and the hostage taker identifies and bonds with the victim (159). Such a breakdown in emotional distance occurred during World War I on Christmas in 1914, when British and German soldiers “exchanged presents, took photographs and even played soccer” (160). It is then difficult to take up arms against such an enemy.

Therefore, military leaders seek to create emotional distance. Cultural distance, or racial and ethnic differences, are used when the enemy is de-humanized with names such as “gook” or “Kraut” (161). Such dehumanization of the enemy, as the Nazis did, resulted in higher kill rates among German than British soldiers in World War II. However, use of cultural differences can be a double-edged sword, as the oppressed group might fight harder, and this hatred is not easy to switch off.

Moral distance is created when a nation condemns an enemy as guilty of injustice and affirms the legality and legitimacy of its own cause. The US has invoked this form of distance with Pearl Harbor in World War II and the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001. The danger here, per Grossman, is that “every nation seems to think that God is on its side” (168). Social distance, or class distance, is cultivated between officers and enlisted soldiers and enables officers to order soldiers to their deaths. However, this distance is weakening. Finally, mechanical distance is created by the modern weapons of war, such as night vision, that depict the enemy as a blob, not a human being. That too makes killing psychologically easier.

The act of intentional killing requires means, motive, and opportunity. For the soldier in combat, as Israeli military psychologist Ben Shalit observes, means and opportunity require effective and relevant strategies for killing the enemy. Most importantly, soldiers must avoid means that would risk their own lives. Therefore, they seek tactical advantages via ambushes, the use of night vision, or the enemy in retreat.

Secondly, soldiers evaluate the relevance of the kill to the tactical situation: Is there a significant loss to the enemy and/or gain to one’s side? Self-defense provides a clear motive. Additionally, leaders and officers are targets for the loss inflicted on the enemy, as are those manning dangerous weapons, such as artillery. When soldiers kill non-combatants, such as women and children, it is difficult to rationalize the action and psychological trauma is more likely to result.

Three factors can overcome the resistance to killing. Modern training techniques simulate combat conditions and make firing more reflexive. These techniques have significantly increased the firing rate since World War II. Secondly, the recent loss of friends and respected leaders at enemy hands fuels revenge killing, as soldiers react with anger. Thirdly, temperament matters: 2% of soldiers simply do not experience a reluctance to kill, nor do they suffer psychological difficulties from extended combat.

Grossman is careful to note that not all of those with this temperament are sociopathic or psychopathic. This group embodies the Hollywood stereotype of the soldier who approaches combat rationally and has no reluctance to kill the enemy. Some in this group are sociopathic and therefore do not experience remorse. Others, dubbed “metaphoric sheepdogs” (183), combine the presence of aggression with empathy. They do not misuse aggression and only channel the aggression toward legitimate enemies. They do not turn on their flock. This 2% seeks out righteous battles. A nation relies on this group in times of crisis.

There are three major variables in the killing equation, namely the “Milgram factors,” the “Shalit factors,” and the predisposition of the soldier. The Milgram factors refer to the demands of authority, group absolution, and distance from the victim. The closer the authority figure to the soldier, the more likely the soldier will kill. The higher the soldier’s respect for the authority figure, the more intense the authority figure’s demands are, and the more legitimate the demands are, the greater the likelihood of killing. A soldier is more likely to kill in a small group when that soldier identifies with the group and is physically close to the group. If the group is legitimate and intensely supports the orders to kill, a soldier is also more likely to participate in the killing. Physical and emotional distance additionally increase the likelihood that a soldier will kill.

The Shalit factors refer to means, motive, and opportunity. A soldier is more likely to kill when there are effective means to kill the enemy and that enemy poses a threat to the soldier and his tactical situation. Soldiers seek to inflict a loss to the enemy and gain to their side. Lastly, the predisposition of the soldier matters. Training and conditioning increase the likelihood that a soldier will kill, as will the recent experiences of a soldier if losses have been suffered at enemy hands. Finally, the temperament of the soldier can predispose that soldier to kill.

Grossman uses these factors to explain the massacre at My Lai in the Vietnam War. The murders were made possible first by cultural distance, with the enemy dehumanized. The experience of the military unit impacted the result as well, as the unit had experienced high levels of casualties. The commander who ordered the killing was a respected authority figure. Grossman does not excuse this massacre but seeks to understand how it happened.

He also applies the framework to suicide bombers, who are homicidal. These bombers obey a religious leader who demands obedience. Those who join tend to have the correct temperament, and they gain group absolution. Lastly, they do not have to see their victims die. Despite all these ways in which the military trains soldiers to kill, there is still a high psychological price for killing for 98% of soldiers.