Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938

In the first three chapters, Ambrose and Brinkley discuss America’s path to the Second World War as well as the fronts in Europe and Asia. They focus on the transition from a foreign policy of neutrality to active participation in this global conflict in the European and Pacific theaters. The authors discuss domestic debates prior to entry into this war. They also discuss the Grand Alliance of the Second World War, the relationship between Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin, and the challenges they faced pragmatically and ideologically. Rise to Globalism also pays special attention to both the most important military campaigns, such as Operation Bagration and Torch.

Paradoxically, the United States was in a secure position in the 1930s. Germany and France distracted Nazi Germany, whereas the socialist Soviet Union appeared relatively weak: “American foreign policy was to support the status quo, but only through vaguely worded statements” (2).

When the war began in September 1939 with Germany’s attack on Poland, Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) intended to stay out but not without aiding the Allies:

Cash-and-carry symbolized much that was to follow. It aligned the United States with the democracies, reiterated American concern and friendship for Western Europe, and made it clear that the country would resist any attempt to upset the balance of power in Europe (3).

Despite its isolationism, the worsening situation in Europe drew America into the war. Congress was less cautious than FDR. However, even the president recognized that “the best defense of Great Britain is the best defense of the United States” (6). As a result, Lend-Lease, which provided supplies and food to the Allies, was codified in March 1941. This initiative helped Britain, which could no longer afford cash-and-carry. FDR still publicly declared his intention to “keep war away from our country and our people” (7).

As Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, the US Navy started to escort its convoys to Iceland. By December 1941, “American foreign policy in Europe had failed to make any significant contribution to stopping—much less overcoming—Hitler” (8).

Similarly, in Asia, Japanese advances affected the Philippines, a US colony. The German invasion of the Soviet Union gave Japan more options. FDR froze Japan’s assets in America, which led to an economic blockade of Japan in such essential areas as oil and steel. Attempts at a compromise—involving Japanese activities in China—failed, and Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, leading to the American declaration of war the next day. In turn, Germany declared war on the US on December 11.

Discussing the European theater, the authors argue that only Hitler could bring together an alliance as unorthodox as the Big Three. Because of ideological differences, the Grand Alliance is also sometimes called “the Strange Alliance”: “So the Grand Alliance was both harmonic and successful. Despite many stresses and strains, it held together to the end, a great achievement” (16).

The Allies periodically met to establish long-term goals like the plans for liberated Europe. For example, at the 1943 Casablanca conference, Roosevelt underscored the goal of unconditional surrender for Japan and Germany. The nature of the Alliance was occasionally tested with Churchill mistrusting Stalin and Roosevelt acting pragmatically. Continuing Lend-Lease was an important way to maintain cooperation among the sides.

An essential question during the first half of the war was the extent to which the Red Army should be helped on the Eastern front. Winston Churchill sought to leave the Soviet troops facing the Wehrmacht alone. However, George Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the US Army, considered this approach a waste of lives and materiel, and “the greatest military blunder in all of history” (15).

The two approaches precipitated debates within the US and Britain, which led to the opening of the second front in Europe in 1944. By this time, the tide had turned, and the Red Army had numerous successes under its belt, starting from the Battle of Stalingrad. The North African front opened earlier, in 1942, with Operation Torch, which was a limited engagement with Nazi Germany. A year later, Anglo-American troops targeted Italy.

Italy was an important example because, in 1945, the Russians were deliberately excluded from deciding its fate. Stalin “recognized the value of the precedent—that those who liberated a country from the Nazis get to decide what happened there” (25). He expected the same quid pro quo for Eastern Europe, but Churchill opposed allowing the USSR to control that region. The tension between needing the Red Army to advance on the Eastern Front while fearing the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, liberated from the Nazis by them, was a central concern for the Anglo-Americans. Ultimately, “the war ended without any sharp break with the Russians” (33).

After this, the authors move on to analyzing the Asian counterpart. There, America lacked the manpower to undertake a massive land war due to being engaged in Europe. At the same time, “the United States devoted nearly 40% of its total effort in World War II to the Pacific Theater” (35). The goals that Americans sought were enormous:

The challenge for American policymakers was how to simultaneously drive out the Japanese, prevent the resurgence of European colonialism, and foster the growth of democratic, capitalist local governments, all without actually making the effort necessary to put the man with a gun on the spot (36).

The authors argue that for the US, the Asian theater was shaped by the combination of military necessities, like winning the war in Europe, and political priorities, such as amplifying China to “great power status” (39). The Asian theater was also shaped by personality, specifically General MacArthur’s egotism. Similarly, on the Chinese side, the Americans backed the statesman Chiang Kai-shek, whom the authors call corrupt, rather than Mao Zedong, whom most Americans viewed “with horror” (40) because of his Communist ideology.

The authors also discuss how the personalities within the Alliance shaped the Asian theater and its postwar future as was the case with Europe. For example, “Stalin’s willingness to cooperate in Asia with the Americans extended beyond China” (42). Stalin and Roosevelt both opposed European colonialism in Indochina. As a result, Roosevelt proposed a “four-power trusteeship” (42) of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Stalin endorsed Roosevelt’s ideas and took them further by suggesting full independence for the region. Colonial Britain opposed this proposal concerned about the fate of its own empire. The authors emphasize the fact that many American decisions made in haste had long-term repercussions after the war, such as the questions of Vietnam and Korea.

After this, the authors examine the question of using the atomic bomb on the cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. This question is complex because the Japanese did not officially surrender despite their apparent loss in the war, in part, because of their concept of honor. The Red Army’s participation in Asian theater—they declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945—was an important consideration to turn the tide: “The impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitation” (44), thought General Marshall. As a result, many analysts argue that the use of nuclear weapons against civilians was “the first major operation of the cold diplomatic war with Russia” (47). The authors suggest that such interpretations are limited because they discount the remaining Japanese kamikazes capable of causing harm. They also overlook the indiscriminate bombing by the Allies of Dresden and Tokyo with a large civilian death toll. The bomb offered a way out for the Japanese by justifying surrender, according to Ambrose and Brinkley. To the American public, “Pearl Harbor had finally been avenged” (48).

At the end of the war, the United States rose to superpower status:

The conclusion of the war therefore found the United States either occupying, controlling, or exerting strong influence in four of the five major industrial areas of the world—Western Europe, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States itself. Only the Soviet Union operated outside the American orbit (49).

The authors underscore the fact that of the three Allies, the Americans sacrificed the least but attained the most benefits.