The Big Truck That Went By: How the World Came to Save Haiti and Left Behind a Disaster

After weeks of interviewing earthquake victims, experiencing aftershocks, and trudging through the rubble of collapsed buildings, Katz finally agrees to take a break. He goes home to Louisville, fearing for his mental health. At his parents' house, Katz spends the week resting, eating, and resupplying. He also decides to see a therapist, and upon entering the office, he immediately scans the walls for signs of structural damage. Noticing a Time magazine with a cover photo of Haiti, he realizes that the image on the magazine feels more familiar than his hometown. Katz confesses to the therapist an emotional numbness; he doesn't feel sad nor has he shed any tears over the dead. Although he doesn't experience any symptoms immediately after the quake, he later recognizes the signs of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). He admits he doesn't want to "get over" the memories; on the contrary, he clings to them. In his current state of latent trauma, they're all he has.

Katz turns his narrative back to the Chery family, living outdoors under a makeshift shelter. While it would be safer to move away from the city, their rent is paid for the year, and they cannot afford to squander it. Rosemide visits her family's vendor cart in the market only to find it's been looted. Security here is virtually nonexistent, as authorities prioritize the "more visible and prosperous establishments" (94), according to Katz. High-interest loans make recouping the Chery's business losses impossible. Weeks after the earthquake, bodies are buried, the injured are treated, and aid shifts to recovery efforts like finding permanent shelter for the homeless.

Katz describes the "three Rs" of disaster aid: "emergency relief, medium-term recovery, and long-term reconstruction" (95). Some workers are still mired in phase one with no clear protocols for long-term follow-up. The biggest priority is shelter, but temporary camps become permanent slums as aid agencies sustain them with food and water rather than focusing on rebuilding. Further, relief agencies focus on security far more than data suggest is necessary. Meetings are held behind security checkpoints where few Haitians can attend. Mike Godfrey, an experienced aid worker, reasons that a better approach is to provide aid directly to families outside the urban centers to prevent migration back to the cities. His advice falls on deaf ears, and the camps swell with displaced Haitians.

The U.S. aid delegation wants to build temporary shelters, but they need the government to provide land, a difficult request given the imprecise and incomplete records of ownership. In Port-au-Prince, land titles are often transferred or forcibly taken without accurate record-keeping. The agency tasked with maintaining these records is underfunded "and could account for less than 5 percent of the country's land" (101), writes Katz. In light of this confusion, multiple interests jostle for government compensation.

When Katz and Evens visit one of these camps, they find it is a self-governing community. The leader of the camp's governing body, Dieusin St. Vil, insists that all communication with the press go through the committee. Once Katz and Evens are able to observe the camp away from St. Vil's presence, they discover malnutrition, lack of shelter, and corruption. Despite all the problems, there are successes: Engineers repair the seaport; the municipal water authority produces more filtered water than before the quake; and medical workers carry out a successful vaccination campaign. But the military's top-down approach makes coordination with local residents difficult and ultimately inefficient. 

Ideas to "fix" Haiti, Katz claims, tend to rely on external approaches, but the logistics of aid distribution often mean that too much money goes to overhead, administration, and private contractors with little left for actual projects. Reformers argue that giving aid directly to local governments is a better strategy, and in 2005 more than one hundred countries sign a declaration to "work through 'country systems and procedures to the maximum extent possible'" (111). Although the U.S. is a signatory, American officials are hesitant because private contractors stand to lose lucrative contracts. As aid groups meet to plan rebuilding strategies, media stories about the settlement camps reinforce and exaggerate long-held stereotypes about unsanitary and dangerous conditions on the ground.

Attempts by celebrities and the U.N. to help are also hampered by misinformation—namely, the danger of a spring rainy season. U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon warns that the ground will "turn to mud, dangerous and diseased" (114). According to Katz, feeding a climate of panic prevents effective, decentralized aid. Nevertheless, it is imperative to move people out of the camps before hurricane season.

In the absence of government enforcement, squatters claim abandoned lots and defend their claims against apathetic police. As camps become permanent settlements, the pressure on Préval to allocate land for resettlement grows. Decades of deforestation, however, have made flood-safe land a rare commodity. Finally, after landowners refuse to make a deal with the government, Préval claims eminent domain and expropriates a stretch of land north of Port-au-Prince. He secures this land nine days before a major donor conference and a visit by former U.S. presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Clinton, whose administration's Haiti policy had been problematic, seeks to redeem himself in his new role as U.N. Special Envoy.

On March 31, donors gather at the U.N. to discuss reconstruction. While ostensibly a "country-led" plan, the details reveal a great deal of latitude for foreign influence, including heavy reliance on the private sector. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pledges $1.15 billion, but also warns that the global community "must do things differently" (125). Doing things differently, however, requires Congressional approval, and that is stymied by a lingering concern over corruption. While Katz admits that corruption exists in Haiti, the media often fails to provide adequate context. Much of the corruption, he claims, exists within agencies whose salaries are below poverty level. Also, a country's level of corruption is often measured by perception which is hardly a scientific measure at all. Haiti is often falsely accused of corruption when much of the donor money never even reaches the country. 

Historically, Haiti is a favorite spot for missionaries who profess a desire to teach Haitians self-reliance, a skill they already possess in abundance, Katz argues. Raised a Southern Baptist, Bill Clinton approaches his Haiti mission with a missionary's zeal and a certainty that Haiti cannot repair itself without outside help. He is determined to be that help, and his enthusiasm for the project plays well to the outside world. Despite a lack of concrete results early on, Clinton persists. His development proposals are based on a report authored by Oxford Economics professor Paul Collier. Collier's report asserts that economic security is paramount, and that the "garments industry has the scope to provide several hundred thousand jobs…" (139), provided that wages are kept low. Accepted economic wisdom suggests that, as workers become more productive, wages increase; but Collier's report argues that wages must be kept low to prevent the industry from moving somewhere cheaper. In fact, it's not jobs that Haiti needs—an entire "informal sector" of work already exists—but stable income, something the garment industry would not provide. It's an industry infamous for its low wages and poor working conditions. Attempts to raise the minimum wage from $1.75 to $5 per day are met with resistance from business owners, but Préval, under pressure from the U.S., arrives at a compromise. He promises $5 to most workers but only $3 for garment workers who are deemed "outsourced" labor.

At the March 2010 donor meeting, the Haitian people present their opinions. Overwhelmingly, they long for sovereignty and self-sufficiency; they want to rebuild their own country, not to outsource the work to foreign contractors. Clinton, however, appears to prioritize the voice of the private sector, personified by Reginald Boulos, a wealthy Haitian businessman who pushes strongly for development of a garment export industry as well as "a responsible elite laying and implementing a vision of development that benefits all Haitians" (148). His speech does not mention participation of average Haitians in the process. American aid, envisioned as a partnership between the private and public sectors, is mistargeted, often funneling money to those who need it least.

The debate over who will lead the rebuilding effort—the Haitian government or foreign actors—never happens. Non-Haitians argue that if foreign governments provide money, they have the right to "dictate terms" (150). U.S. skepticism over Haiti's ability to handle its own rebuilding effort hampers attempts to implement a reconstruction model successful in Indonesia. Oversight is therefore delegated to the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) co-chaired by Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive. While the IHRC is seen as a joint partnership, Katz argues that Clinton has far more influence than his Haitian counterpart. At the close of the donor's conference, pledged donations total $8.4 billion over ten years.