62 pages • 2 hours read
Sara AhmedA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
In Chapter 3, Ahmed begins with an autobiographical excerpt from Frantz Fanon’s The Fact of Blackness in which a white child expresses fear of Fanon’s Blackness and claims that Fanon, whom he does not know, intends to eat him; the child flees for safety into his mother’s arms. Fanon’s language communicates his own feeling of being enclosed, penetrated, and distorted by the child’s fear. Ahmed comments that their mutual fear of one another functions to re-establish their separateness and produce difference during this moment of proximity. She points to the repetitive structure Fanon uses to list the stereotypes he reads in the child’s reaction to him and notes that this reflects the necessity for stereotypes to be repeated in order to “fix the meaning” of the other (Location 1493 of 6419). Such stereotypes also point to fear as another emotion that circulates in an affective economy. The child’s accusation that Fanon has cannibalistic intentions, Ahmed says, shows that fear functions by portraying the other as a threat that may consume the self. This is how fear becomes a justification for violence.
Fear is commonly distinguished from anxiety by the qualifier that fear has a specific object. Ahmed argues that there is also a temporal dimension to the object of fear: Fear relates not only to the approach of the feared object in the present but also to the anticipation of resultant injury in the future. Ironically, fear creates real discomfort in the present that results from anticipation of potential discomfort in the future. She endorses Heidegger’s concept of fear as inextricably bound to futurity and to the uncertainty of a potential threat’s arrival, but qualifies her acceptance of his ideas about anxiety: Whereas Heidegger asserts that anxiety is unattached to specific objects and seems to come from nowhere, Ahmed points out that anxiety can be seen as a particular way of attaching to objects that effectively allows it to come from everywhere.
Because the object of fear can be repressed, fear is often displaced and can stick together various objects as signs of threat. This is how Fanon, who was completely unknown to the child in his story, can become a sign of threat to the child. If the real object of fear is repressed, these stuck-together objects onto which the fear is displaced can inspire fear as they approach, but their passing by cannot truly dispel fear because the basis of the fear is left open and unresolved. Fear helps to create the borders of the self by establishing which objects the self is endangered by and must flee from. This makes its objects necessary to the self and enhances the tendency to stick objects together so that the loss of one object of fear does not threaten the boundaries of the self. Ahmed suggests that one source of repressed fear is the threat of the loss of loved objects. Returning to Fanon’s story and the child running to its mother for comfort, Ahmed asserts that “fear is that which keeps alive the fantasy of love as the preservation of life, but paradoxically only by announcing the possibility of death” (Location 1592 of 6419).
Ahmed turns her attention to the question of which bodies fear which other bodies, pointing out that it is not correlated with objective vulnerability. She proposes that fear increases when openness to the world is viewed as identical with vulnerability and that fear has the effect of shrinking the body and preparing it to flee from the world pressing against it. Fear shrinks bodies so that physical space aligns with social space. As an example, Ahmed returns to Fanon’s story, pointing to Fanon’s own fearful reaction and his feeling that he was being enclosed and trapped by the child’s words and behavior. She notes that this is similar to the way that women are restricted by messages that the world is a threatening place for female bodies. Women are encouraged to see public spaces as threatening and to “flee” to the alleged safety of domestic spaces; their right to occupy public spaces is thus delegitimized. Unequally distributed fear, Ahmed suggests, operates to regulate the movements of bodies in space and to claim certain spaces as the legitimate territories of some bodies but not others.
Fear is essential to the maintenance of collectives and the power structures that govern them. It is not a mere technology of the powerful deployed to preserve the status quo, however. The perception of mutual threat is what binds groups together and creates the sense of a collective in the first place. Ahmed points to the impacts of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. She dissects comments on these attacks made by prominent political figures, noting their recognition that the impact of fear is to restrict mobility and their assurances that the government will act to make citizens secure against this threat. During this time, the proliferation of American flags as signs of cohesion demonstrated that the safe space Americans were encouraged to turn to was the national identity itself. This counteracted the shrinking and immobilizing effects of fear by allowing identification with the collective and its foray into retaliatory foreign wars. At the same time, the government gave itself sweeping new powers of detention that unequally impacted different kinds of bodies. Muslims and those of Middle-Eastern and South-Asian heritage became stuck together into a fear-object category of potential terrorists and were ejected from the collective “we” of American identity.
These events are typical of the process through which a collective invokes security as a means of creating group identity. Threatened transgressions of borders are necessary in order to define the boundaries of the collective and justify measures to secure them. Crises must be declared, and once identified, threat objects must be fought against—not simply to remove a present danger but to remove projected future dangers. This confirms the value of the status quo and links its continuity to future survival. Often, members of the collective are recruited as a kind of internal police on guard against supposed weaknesses in the collective that may contribute to its downfall. The alleged degeneration of values that is pointed to as one potential source of internal weakness is projected onto some types of bodies more frequently than others.
“The Performativity of Disgust” begins with a passage from Charles Darwin, in which he recounts the disgust a “native” seemed to feel over the food Darwin was eating and the disgust he himself felt when the man touched his food with a bare finger. Ahmed considers how the history of interactions between whites and Indigenous peoples informs Darwin’s interpretations of both the other man’s disgust and his own. Ahmed claims that the long history of white people treating Indigenous bodies as commodities influences Darwin’s assumption that he knows what the man is feeling, and by the potential for literal contamination of his food does not trigger Darwin’s disgust: Darwin himself admits that the man’s hand does not look dirty. Rather, it is the man’s status as an Indigenous person that induces Darwin’s disgust. This demonstrates that disgust assumes a badness that is inherent in the objects of disgust themselves and that disgust in part arises from a sense of strangeness, a departure from the ordinary and expected. It is appropriate that the encounter Darwin relates centers on food, because food, which is literally taken into the body, is especially liable to engender disgust. Survival requires taking into the body objects that are not the body; Ahmed reads Darwin’s disgust over the Indigenous man touching his food as “a sign of the danger that the native will be taken into the white man’s body, contaminating the white man’s body” (Locations 1935-50 of 6419).
Ahmed notes that disgust requires an object, and the process of feeling disgust attaches the feeling to the object so that the object itself is assumed to be disgusting. The object must be in some proximity to the body to inspire disgust; it becomes an object of fascination, requiring inspection of its sensory qualities—its texture, its smell, and so on. The body recoils and tries to pull away even as the mind holds on, creating a paradoxical movement both toward and away from the object. The objects that inspire disgust are those that threaten to bring what has been rejected from the self back inside the self or that call attention to the permeability and arbitrariness of borders. Often, objects become contaminated through their history of contact with or resemblance to other objects designated as disgusting, giving the objects of disgust a quality of “contingency.”
This contingency means that disgust is a particularly sticky emotion, so much so that literal, physical stickiness is often experienced as disgusting, as in the case of things that are slimy, that cling to the skin against one’s will. Substances like slime are threatening because of their borderlessness, because they threaten the integrity of borders by accumulating bits of other objects, and because of their history of association with other objects of disgust. Borrowing from and adding to Sartre’s discussion of stickiness and disgust, Ahmed explains that not all things that are sticky—either literally or metaphorically—are associated with disgust: Glue is not generally considered disgusting, and “sticking” by a friend is not considered disgusting. She suggests that there is a quality of voluntariness in the use of glue and in standing by a friend that distinguishes these cases. It is the involuntary blockage of movement—literal or psychic—that marks out stickiness that is disgusting.
The final section of Ahmed’s argument about disgust considers the public performance of disgust through language. She introduces Judith Butler’s concept of performativity, “the way in which a signifier, rather than simply naming something that already exists, works to generate that which it apparently names” by repeated iterations in discourse (Location 2160 of 6419). This indicates a temporal paradox inherent in the performativity of disgust: Acting on the future and creating the object of disgust relies on reiterating a past history of norms. As Derrida points out, however, signs can be cut off from their contexts; Ahmed suggests that a feature of the history of signifiers is a structural resistance to this cutting off and that stickiness functions as a mechanism of this resistance.
Ahmed contends that because speech is a kind of physical expulsion from the body, it is a particularly potent way of warding off threatened contamination by the disgusting object. That there is nearly always an audience for the verbal performance of disgust creates a shared witnessing of the disgusted subject’s expulsion of the disgusting object, redrawing the boundary between them and recreating the purity of the subject’s identity even as it sticks “disgustingness” to the object’s identity. This shared witnessing also reaffirms the collective and the subject’s place in the collective. Ahmed concludes the chapter by examining the role that expressions of disgust played in the public response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, using the public discourse to demonstrate the importance of shared witnessing, iterative viewings of the events and repetitive expressions of disgust, language expressing the fear of borders being penetrated by the proximity of the contaminated other, and the identity-shaping function of the stickiness of disgust.
In Chapters 3 and 4, Ahmed focuses on the separate emotions of fear and disgust while continuing to build a larger cohesive argument. Now that each of the book’s major themes have already been reintroduced in earlier chapters, Ahmed is careful to demonstrate how the new material in Chapters 3 and 4 supports all of these thematic points. In her discussion of fear, she explores fear’s capability to preserve the individual and collective identity and pre-established power structures by “announcing a threat to life itself,” using the shrinking effects of fear to limit the mobility of certain bodies (Location 1507 of 6419). She uses the public texts in this chapter to support this argument but also to demonstrate that fear is yet another example of The Relationship Between Emotion, Language, and Power, and its differential impact on different classes of bodies is another example of The Intersectionality of Emotion, Race, Gender, and Sexuality. Her discussion of disgust makes the argument that it is an ambivalent emotion concerned with the threat of the contaminated proximate other’s potential to breach the boundaries of the self or the collective and that its performativity works to consolidate the identities of both the disgusted and the disgusting—and this discussion also clarifies how these same qualities exemplify The Stickiness of Emotion, Emotions as Shapers of Identity, and Emotions as Social and Relational Practices.
The structures of these chapters repeat the structures of earlier chapters, with an introduction to a specific emotion based on a public text, a middle section that develops arguments related to the emotion, and a final section of review that contextualizes and illustrates these arguments by dissecting yet another public text. Ahmed also continues to rely on rhetorical techniques to create rhythm and interest and emphasize key concepts and their relationships. For example, she continues to consistently use hypophora to identify key questions and then immediately provide answers, as when she says: “How does that attribution work? What does it do? Disgust involves a fascination with the event as image, in the desire to get closer to the image as if it were a salient object in the present” (Location 2228 of 6419). Her practice of reviewing and synthesizing becomes even more explicit as her argument advances; as she adds each new concept, she pauses to make clear how it relates both to earlier ideas and to the larger picture of her thematic arguments. During her discussion of borders and disgust, for instance, she recalls her discussion of Audre Lorde in Chapter 2 and her discussion of insecurity and borders in Chapter 3; she then clarifies how borders and disgust are related to these earlier discussions before moving on. Ahmed’s understanding of pedagogy is evident in her use of these techniques; they not only facilitate understanding but also—like her continued references to reputable scholars and thinkers—reinforce her ethos as an authoritative academic.