58 pages • 1 hour read
Peter ZeihanA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
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Regardless of the dominant technologies of a particular era, countries must have access to their inputs or endure exploitation by others. After World War II, the list of necessary materials expanded “exponentially” (286). All these materials are by-products of the industrial age, and their development, production, and shipping depend on the technologies of that age. Each material has its own geography of success. In the global trade era, no constraints were associated with acquiring these materials, which are essential to modern life. The text posits that in a de-globalized world, countries would attempt to acquire them by any means. China is the world’s biggest importer, consumer, and processor of many of these materials. In the aftermath of China’s fall, the supply of these materials would be insufficient to meet global demand. The current system of international trade depends on the ready availability of these materials and safe trade routes because the location of raw materials and points of processing are typically in different countries.
Perhaps the most important material is iron ore, “the base material that makes everything from buildings to roads to telecom towers” (291) and the main element in steel. China is the largest importer, processor, and exporter of steel. Most of the world’s iron ore comes from places with few security threats in a de-globalized world, but the processing is done in places that would face much difficulty. As a result, the world would need to build smelting capacity elsewhere. The US is a likely candidate, and Sweden, France, and Australia are likely places for steel recycling. However, these countries would be unable to meet global demand.
Bauxite, the raw material that is the world’s main source of aluminum, would be in short supply if China cracked. In 2022, China smelted 60% of the world’s aluminum. Smelting facilities are insufficient to make up for the shortfall, but at least aluminum recycles easily (294). In addition, copper, an important electrical conductor used in semiconductors, is predominantly smelted in China. Chile and Peru meet only about 40% of the global demand.
Half of the world’s cobalt, an energy-dense material that is used in rechargeable batteries, is found deep in the jungles of the Congo. Since that country would not survive de-globalization, access to cobalt would be very limited. Nearly all cobalt refining occurs in China. Lithium, another material for rechargeable batteries, is the least energy dense. For example, a single Tesla requires 140 pounds of lithium. Eighty percent of lithium processing occurs in China, but other countries could process this material, and Australia, Chile, and Argentina are sources of it. While China similarly dominates the silver industry, the material is better distributed geographically and is recyclable.
Although gold has been used to back currencies in the past, its practical uses are more limited. It never corrodes and is turned into commercially traded bars. Lead is easy to mine but is toxic. It is still used in ammunition and lead-acid batteries for vehicles. Since lead is recyclable, the developed world would have access to this material in a de-globalized era. Molybdenum, or moly, is added to steel and enables it to weather extreme temperatures. It is used in aircraft, for example. Sources and foundries for this material exist in the Western Hemisphere.
Platinum-group metals (PGMs) are used in things requiring chemical reactions, such as exhaust systems, dental work, and semiconductors. Three-quarters of these metals come from South Africa, and another 20% come from Russia. They must be obtained from one of those countries. Rare earth elements, which are “used in almost everything in the modern era” (308), have a difficult, dirty refining process. China provides the world with 90% of these elements. However, backup mines and processing facilities exist in South Africa, the US, Australia, Malaysia, and France. Thus, even without China, these elements are still accessible.
Nickel is mixed with steel to make stainless steel. Although China is the largest importer and refiner of nickel ore, four other countries are producers, and the market would be balanced in a de-globalized world. Pure forms of silicon are needed for solar panels and semiconductors. China supplies about one-third of solar panels globally. As a result, with de-globalization, half the world’s population would not have access to solar panels. Semiconductors, which require the highest level of purification, use silicon from a mine in North Carolina. That sourcing gives the US control over the “base material for the digital age” (314). While uranium is likely to become a more popular source of power in a de-globalized world, middle powers, such as Switzerland and Germany, would likely not have a sufficient supply. Zinc generates protection for other elements because of how it corrodes. It is used in propane tanks, alkaline batteries and coated on steel to shield it from weather and sea water. Because zinc is recyclable, is broadly sourced, and has a diversified supply system, it would be available in an era of de-globalization.
The widespread availability of these materials enables modern lifestyles. Without global trade, no country except the US would have access to all the necessary materials because they are too scattered or concentrated. A few countries—the UK, France, Turkey, Japan, and Russia—would attempt to obtain them. The rest would risk reverting to preindustrial ways of life. Smuggling would become a big business, and intra-regional competitions would make access to the materials erratic, thus leading to erratic technological application and economic capacity.
If countries cannot access the inputs necessary to produce the dominant technologies of an era, they would experience exploitation. In the global trade era, the many inputs necessary for modern life were all accessible. With global transport protected, countries securely traded these inputs. Maintaining modern lifestyles depends on that access. Highlighting the themes of The Causes and Consequences of De-globalization and The Dominant Role of the US, Zeihan points out that one consequence would be disruption of that access and that all countries except the US would experience shortages of these inputs.
Zeihan identifies China as the biggest importer and processor of many of these materials. Given that country’s demographic challenges, or population decline, and impending financial collapse, it would no longer be able to process and export these needed materials. The author’s projections about worldwide shortages therefore depend on the demise of China as an economic actor. While Zeihan argues that the US alone would have access to all these materials, however, his analysis of each material leaves that conclusion in question. Since cobalt, which is used in rechargeable batteries, is only sourced in the Congo, which is likely to be impacted in a de-globalized world, raising the question of how the US would access that material. Even for materials that the US could access, a very difficult period of adjustment would be unavoidable. For example, other countries would need considerable time to develop smelting capacities for steel. That period would inevitably result in shortages of steel in the short term for all places. Rare earth elements, which the author notes are used in almost everything, would be in very short supply while other countries developed refining capacities. Currently, China does 90% of that refinement, and the process is extremely dirty. Such a transition from the global trade era, in which all goods were readily available, to a de-globalized world, would be politically risky even in the US. Zeihan is confident that the transitional period would just be a bump in the road and that the US would retain its dominant role in a de-globalized future. This raises the question of whether the author is understating the political response to such discomfort in the US, even if that discomfort is minor compared to the pain in the rest of the world. Elsewhere, shortages and rationing could not only wreak havoc, making piracy and smuggling common, but could also lead to war. A world of regional powers historically has been dangerous. It would be all the more dangerous in a world with multiple nuclear powers, which begs the question of whether such a de-globalized world is really in the US’s interests, as Zeihan assumes.
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