The End of the World Is Just the Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalization

The author considers the impact of all his variables on agriculture. If farmers cannot access manufactured products, such as row croppers, the food supply will experience negative effects. The former USSR has notoriously old equipment and is the origin of 40% of wheat exports. If disruptions in transportation occurred, the impact on the food supply would be devastating. Because agriculture relies on oil and natural gas to run machinery and to make fertilizers and pesticides, energy disruptions would likewise cause trouble for the food supply. Industrial commodities, such as nitrogen fertilizers, would be difficult to obtain in the Eastern Hemisphere. Morocco might supply phosphate, a necessary fertilizer, to that sphere, but potassium fertilizers would be harder to obtain. In addition, agricultural entities need capital to purchase raw stock such as seeds, growth inputs such as fertilizers, and equipment. Difficulty in obtaining financing would present another obstacle to maintaining the food supply: “Simply put, disruption in nearly any sector immediately translates into a disruption of agricultural production with catastrophic outcomes” (415).

France, the US, and Canada are the only food-exporting countries that are capable of continuing to produce their current products in a de-globalized world. For those exporters that have “most of the pieces in place regionally” (416), production would be manageable. Exporters that are unable to maintain access to input flows and depend on factors beyond their control would see reductions in crops. Food exporters that have supply chains outside accessible territories would no longer provide food to the global market.

For the importers of food, those “close enough to exporters both geographically and diplomatically” (417) would get their needs met. Another group would access food at a high price and would be at the mercy of suppliers. The text anticipates that Russia would use food to gain control of former Soviet republics, France would become neocolonial, and other countries would similarly press their advantage. Other importers would not have enough food. Civilizational collapse in multiple countries would be a likely outcome if imported food supplies are so disrupted. China, once again, would be most impacted.

One possible way to mitigate famine is to contribute something to technology to increase yields or to add labor. Myanmar, for example, could improve its agricultural yield with the help of fertilizers. China, with its large population, could return to preindustrial gardening where individuals grow their own crops. This would require a deurbanization campaign of great magnitude. Digital technologies, such as gene editing, can likewise increase yields but are used mainly in row crops grown in the US, Canada, and Australia.

Another way to prevent famine is to grow locally demanded products. The text predicts the return of small-scale farming and wheat plantings. The current locations of wheat are likely to experience disruption, contributing to “a shortage in humanity’s number one foodstuff” (429). The rush to wheat farming in other places would result in rural poverty, with cash crops abandoned.

Seventy percent of corn exports and 85% of soy exports come from Argentina, Brazil, and the US. The biggest exporter of both in the Eastern Hemisphere is Ukraine. The demand for corn would collapse because corn is used primarily for animal feed. As incomes collapsed, people would be unable to afford meat. In contrast, the demand for soy, which is a plant-based protein, would increase. However, Brazil, for several reasons, would not be able to meet the increased demand and would have a shortage of soy.

Behind wheat, the second most popular grain is rice, which is difficult and expensive to grow. It requires intense labor and just the right amount of water. Primarily produced in Asia, its cultivation faces two challenges. The first is a need for continued access to phosphate fertilizers, which would be difficult. China, which sources these internally, might be able to continue. The second challenge, however, is that water access and weather stability are vulnerable to climatic shifts, which are now common.

In the post-Cold War expansion, global emissions increased. If globalization collapsed, people would not abandon modernity but would likely instead burn coal, a particularly dirty source of energy. Climate change impacts regions differently. More rainfall occurs in humid areas, while dry areas get drier. Unfortunately, both tropical and desert climates are not optimal for growing food. The text cites several places, such as California’s Central Valley and southern Ukraine, that grow food and will “feel the biggest brunt of climatic shifts” (447). Wind increases with greater temperature differentiation, and that too can yield more rain. The author worries that rice cultivation will be disrupted by water cycles, either too much or a drying of river sources. Wheat crops, which are grown in dry areas, will be threatened when those areas become too dry. The geographic areas that will be positively affected in terms of crop yield are the big food exporters, including the US, France, Argentina, and New Zealand. However, the increases in production will not make up for the shortfalls elsewhere. The already marginal countries will suffer the most, especially those in dry areas.

A brief review of market dynamics for several products notes that demand for meats would decline in a de-globalized world. Coffee and chocolate supplies, as well as tobacco, would likely decline. Most importantly, palm oil, which is produced largely in Southeast Asia, could be hard to obtain. This problem would be minor for wealthy countries but major for poorer ones. Palm oil is necessary for shelf-stable food, without which some countries would experience famine.

The mix of urbanization and industrialization that has made modernity possible is under threat. If this mix were disrupted, it would take at least a generation to rebuild the systems capable of feeding eight billion people. By the time that is done, countless people would have died from famine. The author worries how political and economic systems would deal with the ensuing food shortages.

Zeihan notes that his book describes what he thinks will happen, not what he wants to happen. After the Cold War, Americans had a chance to engage but instead “started a lazy descent into narcissistic populism” and elected presidents with a “pattern of active disinterest in the wider world” (472). No other world leaders exist. Coupled with demographic patterns, that points toward de-globalization. Although difficult, this period would be temporary. By the 2040s, especially in North America, de-globalization would be “an uncomfortable memory” (474). However, the gap between the wealth in North America and the rest of the world would be stark: “Never before in history has the premier power from the previous era emerged so unassailably dominant at the beginning of the next” (475).