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Anne ApplebaumA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Applebaum notes that the “authoritarian-nationalist, antidemocratic wave” emerged in the past decade (55), not in 1989 with the fall of the Soviet Union when it might have been expected. She cites a Greek political scientist, Stathis Kalyvas, as saying that anti-democratic movements are the rule, not the exception. Since the fall of aristocracy, Applebaum argues, societies have tried to decide “who gets to rule—who is the elite” (59). Liberal democracy and capitalism now serve this purpose. Since they often leave people behind, Applebaum writes, some are “going to challenge the value of the competition itself” (59). She argues it is an issue not just for specific countries, but for democracies across the world.
Moving on to Britain, Applebaum describes how Boris Johnson, the future prime minister of Britain, used to write for the conservative English newspaper Daily Telegraph. For the newspaper, he deliberately wrote false stories about the bureaucracy of the European Union, for example claiming the European Union was going to try to ban double-decker buses. The stories about the European Union struck a chord with conservative English people who had “a nostalgia” for “a world in which England made the rules” (63). However, when he was mayor of London, Johnson would note that nobody in power wanted Britain to leave the European Union. Yet, later Johnson “supported Brexit with the same sunny insouciance, and the same disregard for consequences, that he had long demonstrated in his journalism and his personal life” (70). The fact that the voters’ referendum in 2016 decided in favor of leaving the European Union was a shock, even for Britain’s conservative Tory party, which had launched the campaign to leave. Poor leadership under the prime minister Teresa May kept Britain from staying in a European customs union or addressing the problem of the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland after Britain leaves the European Union.
Next, Applebaum discusses a distinction between two types of nostalgia made by the Russian writer and artist Svetlana Boym in her book The Future of Nostalgia. The first is reflective nostalgia, where people “study the past and even mourn the past, especially their own personal past” (74). However, unlike the second kind of nostalgia—restorative nostalgia—reflective nostalgia does not entail wanting the past back. People with restorative nostalgia actually want to restore the past. More precisely, they want to restore what they believe the past was (74-76). As an example, Applebaum discusses Rembrandt as Educator, a book by German art historian Julius Langbehn that displays what she terms “cultural despair”: “His book was permeated with nostalgia for a different, better time, a time when men were active and not passive, a time when great leaders could make their mark on the world” (77).
After the end of conservative prime minister Margaret Thatcher’s tenure and the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Applebaum argues, Tories felt assured that “Thatcher was right” (78). Although the later prime minister Tony Blair belonged to Britain’s liberal party, the Labour Party, Applebaum argues that he followed many of Thatcher’s ideas. However, Blair was unpopular with conservatives because he caused Britain to integrate economically with Europe and the rest of the world, gave more political independence to Scotland and Wales, and allowed citizens of Northern Ireland to hold passports to the Republic of Ireland (78-80). British conservatives like the philosopher Roger Scruton began to attack the European Union, even though Thatcher had supported it.
Applebaum argues that the British Tory party’s restorative nostalgia helped lead to Brexit, a political movement to separate Britain from the European Union. Conservatives like the Brexit supporter Dominic Cummings saw it as “the last chance to save the country, whatever it took, whatever price had to be paid” (88). However, while Brexit was hailed as a way to get rid of the European Union’s tyranny and restore British democracy, Brexiters “were disgusted by the actual democratic institutions of the United Kingdom in practice” (90). Other conservatives Applebaum knew, like Simon Heffer, voted for the UK Independence Party instead of the Tories (85). Meanwhile, both Brexiters and Labour Party members who opposed Brexit, like Jeremy Corbyn, hoped that Brexit would lead to a disruption of the country’s institutions (93-94).
Further, Applebaum notes, Brexiters became allies of undemocratic movements in other countries, including Hungary and Poland. Hungarian conservative organizations even recruited Brexiters like John O’Sullivan (96-98), who now works for the Hungarian government’s right-wing think tank, the Danube Institute (97). In Britain itself, Brexiters have talked about defunding Britain’s state-run media, the BBC, putting limitations on the courts, and making other changes to the government’s constitution (102-04).
For this chapter, Applebaum’s case study is the Brexit movement in the United Kingdom. Applebaum argues that, rather than being a simple political reform movement, Brexit was motivated by a “desire for chaos” (92), a hatred for Britain’s traditional institutions, and opportunism. Even though Applebaum concedes that many Brexiters were likely genuine patriots, she also argues the movement was based on angry social media-driven rhetoric and outright falsehoods (88-89). Even Boris Johnson, one of Brexit’s foremost advocates, “was just trying to win, to be admired; he wanted to go on telling amusing stories and to gain power” (101-02). Essentially, Applebaum is arguing that Brexit was not really about leaving the European Union. Instead, it was about personal ambition and grievances against the current state of Britain. Most importantly, Applebaum suggests that Brexit was underlaid with an “underlaying frustration” that sprung out of the restorative nostalgia she describes. A vague desire to restore Britain’s past as a great, globe-spanning empire made conservatives receptive to Brexit, even though Brexit rejected the principle of free, international markets that British conservatives once embraced.
Another crucial point is that the supporters of Brexit aligned with the authoritarian parties of Poland and Hungary that Applebaum previously described. This is reflected in both how Tory administrations in the British government did not oppose the policies of Hungary and Poland and in conservative journalistic magazines hosting events sponsored by organizations affiliated with the Hungarian government (94-96). As Applebaum writes, “I don’t think it’s coincidental that, at about this time, a few British conservatives […] also became enamored of undemocratic polities in other places” (94). Even though Brexit and the Fidesz and Law and Justice parties are very different and emerged in different countries, Applebaum would argue they share similar anti-democratic, anti-immigration, and nationalist characteristics and are supported by individuals with similar grievances.
By Anne Applebaum