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David BerrebyA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Stephen Jay Gould was a paleontologist who is the enemy of many Darwinian fundamentalists for his controversial “punctuated equilibrium theory” that evolution progresses in random spurts, not smoothly. Darwinian fundamentalists object to his theories because he claims scientists cannot explain much of evolution by general natural selection principles. Gould believed species’ environmental adaptations are accidental. Darwinian fundamentalists dogmatically believe that general principles of natural selection explain evolution. Berreby elaborates, “Gould’s frequently made point is that it is far easier to imagine a trait is adaptive than to prove it, so refusing alternative explanations is a mistake” (285-86). Darwinian fundamentalists reject any notion that species evolve through accidents: “They want principles, whose operations can be relied on, whatever the messy details. And one of those principles is that everything in life has a function” (286).
Gould split one human kind (Darwinists) into two newly formed, bitterly opposed human kinds (Darwinian Fundamentalists and Punctuated Equilibrium Theorists) by proposing a new idea which slightly alters the original idea. Five hundred years prior, no human-kind group called “Darwinist” or “Darwinian,” or even “Evolutionist” existed, then it did and it existed as one human-kind for a long time, until it became two different human kinds as allegiances were formed around Gould’s new idea. Scientists now hold strong emotional connections to which human kind they belong: Darwinian Fundamentalist or Punctuated Equilibrium Theorist, and they feel hatred for the opposing group; they ascribe stigma based on such beliefs. Berreby explains, “At first, an idea defines the trait. […] Human-kind feelings kick in and the idea becomes the banner we wave to rally those feelings and the shibboleth used to test other people’s commitment” (288).
Tribalism does not inform which idea is correct. Darwinians seek “ultimate causes”—why it exists. This is as opposed to “proximate causes”—how the trait works and what brain functions it involves. Determining ultimate causes requires assembling many separate pieces of information into one complete theory. Proximate causes are the separate pieces of information. Berreby concludes, “For human-kind problems, that’s an attractive prospect” (289). Scientific research is conducted at many different levels, and theories utilized in one field don’t always match those in others. Berreby’s refrain is, “Ask a different question, you get a different answer” (290): Scientists conducting research across multiple levels of discipline encounter differences in the way “disciplines interrogate the world” (290).
Neither approach is “right” or “wrong;” each viewpoint is not neatly related to the others. This is the scientific error “race-realists” or “racial scientists” make—attempting to reach conclusions in one level of discipline based on research from a separate level of discipline. Science does not support the connections they draw in the relevant level of discipline. Human-kind research is difficult partly because it requires combining multiple levels of discipline into one study. Human-kind researchers “are mixing anthropology with biochemistry, brain scans with psychology” (291). Darwinian fundamentalists believe theories will one day fit perfectly among every scientific discipline. Many scientists believe this goal is unattainable. Scientists conduct most research within one discipline to ensure its results are applicable solutions to real problems.
E.O. Wilson coined the term “consilience:” a probabilistic approach to the relationship between scientific disciplines and their respective levels of analysis which dictates “[t]heories that agree on several levels are more likely to make good predictions and lead to further work than theories that contradict each other” (294). However, scientific research shifts consensuses in different disciplines, so they cannot achieve a stable consensus among varying disciplines. Different disciplines inform each other, but don’t determine each other’s conclusions. Two disciplines agreeing today does not mean they will agree tomorrow. Cross-discipline applicability of scientific theories is why Gould advocated “pluralism,” in which differing theories coexist in different disciplines.
People practice pluralism daily, applying different approaches to different purposes. Berreby relates, “The different camps in science stimulate and correct one another. Disunity, that constant struggle of different traditions, in the absence of some ultimate Truth to settle everything, is what makes science strong and lively” (296). Pluralists believe in standards but recognize that problems create standards and humans establish problems. Scientists must account for the “human context” of problems in their solutions. Darwinian Fundamentalists believe the opposite: Context is irrelevant, and eventually all disciplines will share one universal truth. Scientific certainties don’t exist. Science utilizes theories, not conclusions. Science claims probability, not certainty. If scientific certainty is impossible, so is the notion of a universal truth which spans scientific disciplines.
Charles Darwin addressed human kinds. Darwin’s research on “survival of the fittest” shows “creatures often made themselves less fit so that others could do better” (302). Altruism is difficult to explain when survival of the fittest is applied to individual self-serving beings, but altruism is almost universal in Earth’s creatures. Pure natural selection of individual creatures should eliminate altruistic behavior, but natural selection does not operate on individual creatures—it works on groups. Berreby explains, “Ethical behavior restrains the individual’s desires for the sake of fairness, kindness, and the rights of others” (302). Altruism allows groups to prosper and evolve. This is “the idea that actions could evolve ‘for the good of the group’” (303).
Human-conceived groups are not permanent enough for evolution. The only thing stable and permanent enough for natural selection is DNA. Richard Dawkins utilizes this theory to argue humans have a “selfish gene,” with the sole purpose of copying itself. This partially explains altruism. If siblings “share genetic information and one dies so the other may live on, the fitness of their shared genetic code has not been reduced” (305). “Race realists” use this theory to argue people prefer their race over others because members of their race are more genetically similar. This pseudoscience commits the error of collapsing levels of discipline. What humans refer to as race is frequently a description of appearance with no bearing on genetics.
Similarity at the visible level does not translate to similarity at the genetic level, or others. The ability to distort the major flaw in Darwinian fundamentalist logic to support racial pseudoscience demonstrates that Darwinian fundamentalist ideology is flawed and harmful. Flawed racial theories are not easily detached from Darwinian theory because Darwinians and racial pseudoscientists share the assumption “that certain human kinds are objectively real, as determined at the genetic level of analysis, and that these human kinds predict how people will act” (310). Human action cannot be explained without including the mind. Human-kind decisions favor the brain over genes. If genes contradict a human-kind message, the human-kind message prevails.
Other scientists explain “ethical” human behavior as “reciprocal altruism:” people helping others because societal rules dictate others will return the favor. Reciprocal altruism bridges the selfish gene and the altruistic person. The anthropologist Robert Trivers stipulates necessary conditions for reciprocal altruism: frequent contact; differing treatment of different actors; the ability to keep track of actors’ actions. Reciprocal altruism is the reason humans have a cheat detector. Reciprocal altruism cannot function in large groups whose members are strangers. Large groups require “reciprocity with symbols, not actions” (313). People substitute personal knowledge of others with shared rules. Mental codes desire conformity with rules and those around us adhering to the rules. Utilizing symbols and rules, humans’ specialized human-kind faculty employs a coalition-tracker code to find alliances with strangers.
Every person’s experiences are ever-changing, and every person’s mental response to those experiences is also ever-changing, so our mental categories must be in constant flux. Our thoughts and perceptions are the products of mind meeting world. Human kinds are mental experiences, flexible and varying. Traditional human kinds will persevere though, for two reasons: Discussing human kinds as mental experiences is difficult for laypeople not versed in modern neuroscience; many lack the political and economic freedom to discuss human kinds fluidly and subjectively, even if they grasp the language. Berreby adds, “You’re stuck with the human kinds that people believe in now, however well you can explain the origins of those beliefs. The new science of human kinds won’t undo politics” (322). To better understand human kinds, forget old human-kind arguments and ask better questions about human kinds:
[H]ow does the ever-changing mind relate to unchanging institutions? [H]ow can people be seen as only tokens of their human kinds? [H]ow many different, separate processes make up kind sight? […] [H]ow should we understand human kinds as causes and explanations? (325)
Answers to these questions are societally important because they affect issues of racism, war, medicine, prejudice, justice, policy, culture, economics, and other aspects of daily human life. The human-kind code alone does not make anything happen. People acting on the human-kind code produce real world effects. Better understanding the human-kind code will help people own it and control it for themselves instead of allowing others to manipulate it externally.
Darwinian fundamentalists seek discipline spanning universal truths, but other scientists advocate “pluralism” because various levels of scientific discipline ask different questions, which receive different answers. Theories do not fit neatly within every scientific discipline, but they do not need to. Scientists can inform their research with theories from a foreign discipline, but the foreign information won’t determine conclusions. In their insistence on universal truths, Darwinian fundamentalists engage in groupthink and human-kind stereotyping. Survival of the fittest shows that species evolve as entities. Individual behavior matters less than group behavior. Therefore, humans dominate lions even though an individual lion could easily best an individual human; humans have a greater capacity to evolve our groups because of our mental code for human kinds. This is also why altruism survives evolution: Altruistic societies survive evolution better than selfish societies. Cultural rules permit altruism by communicating with symbols to group members that altruism will be reciprocated.
The ability to mentally code human kinds is powerful. It enables us to evolve and build large societies that dominate Earth. It also enables us to promote harmful stereotypes and stigmatize. Our ability to think in human kinds is one of the most amazing things humans can do, and we should keep doing it. However, we should also recognize its flaws and learn how to better use its powers for good while avoiding its harmful uses. Human-kind beliefs do nothing by themselves. People must act on human-kind beliefs for them to affect the real world. We have power over our human-kind beliefs—we are in control.