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David BerrebyA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Sir Francis Galton was the first of many scholars who believed in assessing human kinds “by objective measurements and calculations” (46). Galton recorded correlations between individuals’ observable characteristics, such as forearm length and head size, then generalized from the correlations. Galton pioneered fingerprint analysis, questionnaires, and composite visual portraits to stereotype appearance and draw conclusions based on such appearance. He invented the phrase “nature versus nurture” and “believed heredity was the key to human behavior” (47). Galton’s scholarship erroneously allows rules to dictate data, instead of vice versa. For example, a facial blending of a group of 10 famous dictators will produce a blended face with the features of 10 dictators only because “dictator” is the rule from which the faces are chosen. Berreby explains, “Sort photos of people according to any rule you please—by birthdate, number of letters in their names, favorite color—and you can blend them into one face” (49).
This scholarship lead to “the bell curve, or ‘normal distribution’—a bedrock of modern statistics” (49). While beneficial in statistical analysis, bell curves cause dangerous stereotypes in measurements of people. Historically, people use bell curves to measure “normalcy” in various metrics, such as height and weight, with “normal” connoting “desired.” While “normal” in statistics means “neutral,” when applied to measurements of people it often connotes “desirable.” Such measurements again suffer from rules dictating data: A measurement of 1,000 British men will produce a bell curve just as a measurement of 1,000 Chilean women will produce a bell curve. The curve describes only the relation of the members selected for measurement to each other, nothing else.
Some current psychologists and scholars advocate for stereotypes. Scholars like Steven Pinker believe “if a trait is more likely to be found within some human kind than in others, then a stereotype might be better than nothing for making predictions” (52). Statisticians call this “analysis of covariance—measuring how closely two different measurements are linked” (52). Many social psychologists object to this reasoning, arguing “people’s perceptions of human kinds [aren’t] stable enough for statistical thinking” (53). United States law enforcement has confirmed this in practice. They learned that computer generated categories better screen for potential threats than human-generated categories. Unconscious biases create human kind groupings, but computers function only by explicitly stated rules. Berreby elaborates, “Data […] confirmed that well-targeted methods for creating truly good statistics about real people could spot more criminals than do human-kind predictions based on race, ethnicity, or gender” (55). Human-kind beliefs and stereotypes are not composite portraits or bell-curves based on good statistical analysis of groups. Human-kind beliefs are the real world meeting the human mind.
People understand various aspects of the world in different ways, and each mode of understanding requires acceptance of its categories. To construct a new human-kind, one must convince people it already exists: “Once experts define a kind of person and offer a procedure to reveal who belongs, then that kind is well on its way to practical reality” (56). Once a human kind is created, its members perpetuate “looping effects” to shape its definition. Berreby describes looping effects as follows:
A category of person starts out as an idea in someone’s mind. That person convinces other people that he or she is onto something, and the idea spreads. Then people who belong to the newly minted human kind start using the concept to guide their behavior and understand themselves. That creates evidence this kind of person is ‘really’ out there. (57)
Looping effects cause human-kind evolution as the group’s members shape it over time.
Though beliefs about human kinds are human inventions, “not discoveries about an objectively real world” (59), such beliefs have profound impact on real people. They aren’t illusions, but they aren’t fantasies either. Essentialists believe human-kinds represent never-changing, hidden truths. They argue that in-group differences are minor and do not affect the absolute essence of the group. Statistical reasoning contradicts essentialist arguments, but humans’ strong emotions regarding human kinds frequently leads to ignorance of statistical analysis of statistics in favor of essentialism. Our perceptions rely on both the mind and the real world; human kinds are constantly changing products of such perceptions. The philosopher Catherine Z. Elgin explains, “To figure out how human kinds are made, then, the right place to look is between the absolute and the arbitrary” (63).
Categories allow people to treat groups of individuals as a monolith: “interchangeable instances of at least one trait they all share” (64). This skill is central to human evolution. Aristotle practiced this categorization by matching a thing to features deemed either necessary or sufficient to the category. Ludwig Wittgenstein noted that humans don’t actually think this way—we categorize things based on their “family resemblance.” Wittgenstein’s work influenced the “probabilistic” theory of categories. Categories frequently express hidden connections: “the link between things that don’t share obvious traits” (66). Human kinds are also comprised of entities, “whose members have obligations that stem from their membership” (67). Categories inform people about the members of an entity and offer explanations regarding entities. Berreby explains, “[I]t’s virtually meaningless to talk about a category without talking about who is using it and for what purpose” (68). Each category is a solution to a particular person’s problem. Categories are thoughts—mental actions tailored to circumstances—and change with changing needs. Even formal institutional categories change with changing goals. For example, the United States government defines “Hispanic” differently in the Department of Justice than it does in the Bureau of the Census because the word “Hispanic” is answering a different question in each department.
Human kinds are created “by ignoring some of what you know, while paying heightened attention to the rest” (71). The human mind works by taking chaotic and messy signals from different parts of the brain, selecting the important ones, then transmitting a summary: “a useful representation of what the incoming noise is ‘really’ about” (72). The brain regions that receive the summary combine it with other summaries they then sum up and transmit to other regions. Throughout this process, the brain alters information submitted to comport with its notion of correctness. This “tunnel effect,” causes people to “cling to their perceptual map, even when it is wrong” (73). This repeatedly occurring process produces thoughts, feelings, and perceptions. Other people’s beliefs influence the brain’s notion of correctness. Social psychology research has shown that “Human kinds are convincing when others are already convinced, not only because we want to conform but also because, as a practical matter, people’s beliefs organize their lives and thoughts” (74).
“Founder effects” also influence our human-kind beliefs. Founder effects are “an accidental pairing of a set of people with some easily spotted feature” (74). The mind correlates the easily spotted feature in the pair to a human-kind grouping. Such grouping may be arbitrary, but its obviousness tricks the perceiver into believing it is consequential. Founder effects become real human traits through looping effects and “invention of tradition,” which describes traditions appearing or claiming to be old, but that are actually recently originated and frequently invented. For example, Galton’s bell curve relied on a sense of Britishness as a human-kind from his own mind—“from a bias for essentialism, amplified by looping effects, founder effects, and invented traditions” (79). This same pattern forms harmful theories on race, ethnicity, and other human kinds.
Human kinds like race and ethnicity are not baseless—they are real categories based on defined characteristics. However, they are not more appropriate than alternative categories not used to group people, such as hair color, favorite vegetable, or forearm length. Berreby explains, “That’s how we know that the source of our beliefs is not physical evidence about people” (81). Racial and ethnic categories were devised by people for particular reasons and “have a birthdate in human history” (82). Race is the product of human divisions into groups with obvious differences. Race as a human kind depends on the notion that the easily perceived difference is unchangeable and due to ancestry.
However, racial boundaries evolve and have never been rigid. Race is not based on genetics, heredity, or ancestry. Berreby states, “Asking if race is real, then, is like asking if money is real. Both questions are meaningless without a framework” (84). Politically and economically, both are real because people believe they are real. Genetically and chemically, neither are the truth they connote. Ethnic group derives from the ancient Greek word Ethnos, used to describe people or a nation. The phrase “ethnic group,” however, is recent, arising in the 1940’s to describe non-WASP white Americans. The modern concept of ethnic group is imprecise. Scholars use it “to describe people who are thought to belong together because of shared traits that are inherited, not chosen” (86). This is not true for most groups of people who believe themselves to be an ethnic group, but sociologist Max Weber argues, “This notion need not be true […] What counts […] is that it be believed” (86).
Alternative human-kinds are created constantly: working class, white collar, red state, blue state, Saint Louis Cardinals fans, Saint Louis Browns fans, horse carriage operators, Uber drivers. All have a beginning date, end date, and a purpose. Berreby notes, “The root mystery of human kinds lies in the problem Galton ignored: why the mind picks some traits to mark human kinds and ignores others” (91).
Human-kind beliefs are not scientific, but people want to believe their beliefs represent absolute truths, so they ascribe pseudoscience to justify their prejudices. Galton drew erroneous conclusions from forearm length and composite portraits; Pinker argues that stereotypes are better indicators of behavior than statistical analysis; and “race realists” use variation in skull shape to justify flawed racist theories. Science produces theories, not conclusions, but humans desire certainty. When choosing between high statistical probability based on scientific research and flawed assertions that bolster irrationally held beliefs, people frequently choose the latter. Human-kind beliefs are perceptions that suffer from unconscious bias. Human-kind beliefs do not reflect reality but also do not reflect only the mind—they are a combination of reality and the mind, a collision of the two.
Human kinds evolve, and human-kind group members shape their kind’s definition through “looping effects.” The group’s definition shapes its members’ behavior, and their actions affect the group’s definition. The group “gamer” has exhibited looping effects shaping its definition. The label “gamer” was once prescribed to a group exhibiting a particular set of traits by a third party. In the decades since, members of the group “gamer,” originally unwillingly inserted in the group, altered the group characteristics continually. The present-day group “gamer” bears little resemblance to the original “gamer” group. Essentialists believe human-kind groups are static, that they represent unchanging truths, but statistical reasoning contradicts this theory.
Categories are explanations; they answer specific questions. A category is meaningless without knowing its purpose. For example, the question “what color is John’s skin?” may be useful to a cinematographer but is useless to a drill sergeant. The question’s purpose dictates the category’s relevance. Categories’ relevance constantly changes. The cinematographer who needed to know the color of the actor’s skin at work no longer needs to know that information when planning a dinner party; the cinematographer will now need to fit the actor into another category: vegetarian, wine drinker, etiquette habits, etc. Therefore, Berreby describes human-kind beliefs as “ignoring some of what you know, while paying heightened attention to the rest” (71). When filming the movie, the cinematographer ignores the actor’s dietary preferences and focuses on his skin color; when planning a dinner party, the cinematographer ignores the actor’s skin color and focuses on dietary preferences.
Human brains alter received information to comport with beliefs. This distorts our perceived reality through illusions like “founder effects” and “invention of tradition.” Our inherent biases affect our perceived reality. Two people observing the same reality perceive two different events.